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INVERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AMY ADLERt
"[T]he issue of children and pornography [is]
almost impossible to discuss in a reasoned way."
-Former Solicitor General Drew Days'
INTRODUCTION
Child pornography law is the new crucible of the First
Amendment. It tests the limits of modern free speech law the way
political dissent did in the times of Holmes and Brandeis. It is where
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to thank Harry Adler, Ed Baker, Mary Anne Case, Barry Friedman, Dan Filler, David
Garland, Abner Greene, Hillary Kelleher, Pearson Marx, Rick Pildes, and Lenn
Robbins. Keith Buell provided spectacular research assistance. Thanks also to Cory
Endo, who pitched in with excellent last-minute research assistance. This Article is
dedicated to my father, Harry Adler (1932-1999), who encouraged me to write it and
who read and commented on an earlier draft. How I wish that he could read it now.
I John Heilemann, Big Brother Bill, WIRED, Oct. 1996, at 53, 54 (quoting Drew
Days).
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popular pressure on courts and legislatures exerts itself most
ferociously; it is where the greatest encroachments on free expression
are now accepted. Therefore, the law of child pornography is as
important for free speech scholars to scrutinize today as was the law of
subversive advocacy earlier this century.
The First Amendment as we understand it was born amid grave
concern for our national security. The nation was at war. The
Supreme Court's first significant free speech cases arose in
prosecutions under the 1917 Espionage Act for agitation against the
war and the draft. Those cases begot the fabled "clear and present
danger" test; they also eventually gave us the ringing dissents of
Holmes and Brandeis that still inform our "liberal nostalgia" for that
3era.
When we think of the First Amendment, we think of this history:
battles over subversive advocacy, and later, socialist or communist
ideology. Yet, as John Hart Ely points out, our nostalgia for that
period in the Court's history ignores the harsh results of the cases.
For example, all of the defendants in the first three "clear and present
danger" cases ended up in prison for ten years "for quite tame and
ineffectual expression."4 Ely recounts a history of free speech
jurisprudence, understood through the subversive advocacy cases, in
which the Justices acquiesced to the vexing political pressures of this
century, and in particular to McCarthyism.' In his view, our
2 There was significant draft evasion and widespread fear of a leftist uprising. See
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATEs 80-97 (1941) (providing
background on the Supreme Court free speech cases that arose under the Espionage
Act).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 107 (1980). Of course, Justice
Holmes only moved into dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). He
had recently written the majority opinions in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919), and Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), in which the Court sustained
convictions for what seems by today's standards to be astonishingly timid political
dissent. These opinions cannot be reconciled with his about-face in Abrams. See HARRY
KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 130-49 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (discussing the
roles of Holmes and Brandeis in First Amendment jurisprudence). For an argument
that the standard history of the First Amendment is incomplete, see David M. Rabban,
The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
4 ELY, supra note 3, at 107. Justice Douglas termed the defendants in Dennis
"miserable merchants of unwanted ideas." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 589
(1951) (Douglas,J., dissenting). He focused on their unpopularity to suggest that they
did not present a genuine threat to the nation. Id.
5 Ely writes: 'Judges by and large are drawn from the same political and social
ranks as elected officials, and are subject to many of the same anxieties." ELY, supra
note 3, at 112. Discussing communism, he writes:
INVERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
commitment to the First Amendment fluctuates in response to
cultural anxiety. Thus, the greatest threats to free speech, and the
most crucial need for First Amendment vigilance, arise in times of
social crisis."
It may seem like sacrilege to say that the law of child pornography
is as important to the First Amendment as is the law of subversive
advocacy. Even mentioning these different categories of cases in the
same sentence may appear to be mixing the sacred and profane. The
subversive advocacy cases concerned core political First Amendment
speech,7 whereas child pornography law is about "sordid"s sexual
cravings.
But the lofty political battles that concerned Holmes and Brandeis
are behind us. Pedophiles have emerged as the new communists in
our popular imagination. Many scholars have contended that anxiety
over child pornography fills the gap left open by the fall of
communism. Pedophilia allows us to "locat[e] ... a demon, a
The Communist scare that followed the Second World War and continued
into the 1950s, however, snapped the country generally, and the Court along
with it, back into earlier form. Of course to convict the Communists the clear
and present danger test had to be modified somewhat.... [I]t wasn't until we
were well into the 1960s (and out of the spell of McCarthyism) that our
national self-confidence returned to the point where the Court could be
counted on to invalidate legislation making criminals of Communists. This is
all familiar history. It is all quite understandable. And it all mocks our
commitment to an open political process.
Id. at 108; see also KLXWVEN, supra note 3, at 187-211 (describing the dominance of Cold
War fears in American life and in the Court's speech cases ).
" See also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 449, 449-50 (1985) (arguing that the First Amendment must do
"maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is
most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically").
7 For one case articulating the idea that political speech is the core of the First
Amendment, see Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966). See also Young v. Am.
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (finding that there is a hierarchy of First
Amendment Nalues in which political speech is paramount and sexual or pornographic
speech is of little value); CASS R- SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (First Free Press Paperback ed. 1995) (stating that political speech is of
paramount importance). For a rejection of this view, see C. EDwIN BAKER, HuMNAN
LIBERT YAND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989) (arguing that protection of individual liberty,
not politics, forms the core of the First Amendment). For a view that dissent is the key
to understanding the First Amendment, see STEVEN H. SHiFERIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990).
Chatroom Pervert AvoidsJail THE PEOPLE, Aug. 13, 2000, at 13.
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creature harder to find since the collapse of the 'evil empire."" As
one critic notes: "Pedophilia is the new evil empire of the domestic
imagination: now that communism has been defanged, it seems to
occupy a similar metaphysical status as the evil of all evils.... .""'
Scholars have frequently compared our obsession with child sex abuse
to McCarthyism. (Some, in a more histrionic vein, have drawn
parallels with the Salem witch hunts.)" Just as in McCarthyism, when
"concern with domestic subversion began to dominate American
life," 2 so the problem of children's sexual vulnerability "now
structures our culture."5 As I will document below, the nation has
declared a new "war"-on child sexual abuse-and this battle defines
14our era.
Yet for all of its importance, legal scholars have ignored the law of
child pornography."' In contrast to the robust academic discourse
9JAMES R. KINCAID, EROTIC INNOCENCE: THE CULTURE OF CHILD MOLESTING 12
(1998).
ILAURA KIPNIS, BOUND AND GAGGED 5 (1996).
See, e.g., LAWRENCE WRIGHT, REMEMBERING SATAN 165 (1994) (comparing the
crisis over child sexual abuse to Salem witch hunts).
12 KALVEN, supra note 3, at 187.
3 KINCAD, supra note 9, at 14.
14 "[Mqe are all implicated in a contemporary discourse on children, sexuality,
and assault so mighty that it comes close to defining our moment." Id. at 5-6.
Compared to other areas of First Amendment law, child pornography has been
largely unexamined. Few law review articles have been written on the subject of child
pornography and the First Amendment. The following is a list: Ronald W. Adelman,
The Constitutionality of Congressional Efforts to Ban Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A
First Amendment Assessment of S. 1237, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 483
(1996); Sandra Zunker Brown, First Amendment-Nonobscene Child Pornography and Its
Categorical Exclusion from Constitutional Protection, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1337
(1982); Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional
Question, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 439 (1997); David T. Cox, Litigating Child Pornography
and Obsceniy Cases in the Internet Age, 4 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1 (1999), available at
http://journal.law.ufl.edu/-techlaw/4-2/cox.html; L. Steven Grasz & Patrick J.
Pfaltzgraff, Child Pornography and Child Nudity: 11hy and How States May Constitutionally
Regulate the Production, Possession, and Distribution of Nude Visual Depictions of Children, 71
TEMP. L. REv. 609 (1998); Josephine R. Potuto, Stanley + Ferber = The Constitutional
Crime of At-Home Child Pornography Possession, 76 Kxi L.J. 15 (1988); John Quigley, Child
Pornography and the Right to Privacy, 43 FLA. L. REV. 347 (1991); Frederick Schauer,
Codfiing the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 285; Lisa S.
Smith, Private Possession of Child Pornography: Narrowing At-Home Privacy Rights, 1991
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1011.
In contrast to the limited number of articles, there have been a significant number
of student notes, particularly on the subject of child pornography on the internet.
Even so, the number of notes about child pornography is dramatically smaller than the
number addressing obscenity or adult pornography. Several articles and notes have
INERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
that has grown up around obscenity law or adult pornography, the law
of child pornography has been left to occupy its own peculiar and
disagreeable realm. It is the least contested area of First Amendment
jurisprudence.
While academics have looked the other way, however, child
pornography has become a central target of real world censorship. In
fact, it has surpassed obscenity as the most vigorous field of censorship
prosecutions."' It has spawned an elaborate body of case law, and
spurred daring legislative measures. Legal scholars have occupied
themselves with more tasteful topics-and ones that may appear to
present more serious challenges to free speech jurisprudence. Left to
its own devices, child pornography law has undergone a dramatic
growth spurt, unchecked by critical analysis.
The growth of child pornography law has starting and
unappreciated doctrinal importance. 7  As both the definition of
"child pornography" and the rationales for banning it have expanded,
they have mutually undermined one another. These twin
developments have had a synergistic effect: the result is that child
pornography law has drifted quite far from its original purpose-to
protect children from sexual abuse. In doing so, child pornography
law has introduced into the First Amendment a radical view of
considered non-First Amendment topics, such as the statutory interpretation
implications of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
513 U.S. 64 (1994). See. e.g., Patricia A. Burke, Note, United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc.: Strtiching the Limits of Statutogy Interpretation?, 56 LA. L. REV. 937 (1995)
(discussing the Court's extension of a mens rea element to separate subclauses in the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act).
P, House Subcommittee Criticizes DOJfor Not Prosecuting Internet Obscenity, TECH L.J., at
http://techlajournal.com/crime/20000524.htm (visitedJan. 8, 2001) (reporting that
Department of Justice "obscenity funds were spent on child pornography
prosecutions"); Memorandum from Eric H. HolderJr., Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice, to all U.S. Attorneys Re: Prosecutions Under the Federal
Obscenity Statutes (June 10, 1998), at http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/
cbscen.htm (discussing federal obscenity prosecutions, noting that the Justice
Department gives "priority" to cases brought under the federal child pornography
statutes).
17 In a separate article, I analyze the cultural implications of child pornography
law. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209 (2001)
[hereinafter Adler, Perverse Law]. There I argue that laws regulating child
pornography may produce perverse, unintended consequences. By requiring intense
scrutiny of depictions of children, and by intensifying the "taboo" surrounding child
pornography, the law may perpetuate and escalate the sexual representation of
children that it seeks to constrain.
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speech-how it works and why we restrict it.'8 We are so horrified by
the crime of child pornography that, to combat it, we have inverted the
First Amendment, disrupting established categories and assumptions.
Child pornography law-an area of First Amendmentjurisprudence that
has been virtually ignored by scholars--has widespread implications for
all of free speech.
In its early struggles over the meaning of the First Amendment, the
Court ultimately rejected the notion that speech could be banned
because it might provoke dangerous ideas. Child pornography law,
however, has begun to reverse this tradition. As I will show, child
pornography law has begun to allow for the categorization and
regulation of speech based on how people might respond to it. It has
come to permit the government to police the realm of fantasy, a realm
supposedly protected under the modem First Amendment.
These developments in child pornography law have subverted
traditional First Amendment principles that separate speech from
conduct.'9 In fact, these developments have validated a theory of
speech that is startlingly similar to the view that has been rejected
when offered by antipornography feminists, such as Catharine
MacKinnon, and anti-hate-speech theorists.0 Child pornography law
has ratified the dissident theories that underlie these critiques of the
First Amendment.
An evaluation of child pornography law is particularly pressing
right now. Its importance in new contexts is evident. Courts have
begun to cite child pornography precedents to support restrictions on
free speech that have nothing to do with children: the D.C. Circuit
relied on child pornography precedents last year to support a decision
that threatens the right of newspapers to print truthful information of
is As I will show, the rules of child pornography law often run contrary to the most
basic of First Amendment principles-if there are such things as basic First
Amendment principles. See Schauer, supra note 15, at 285 (discussing the increasing
complexity of speech doctrine); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 864 (1991) ("First Amendment doctrine is almost
infinitely complex."); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1249-50 (1995) ("First Amendment doctrine is... striking chiefly for its
superficiality, its internal incoherence ... ."); infra Part 1II.C.4 (addressing these
questions more fully).
19 Although the role of this distinction is central, it is also contested.
Furthermore, it has produced a chaotic and unruly doctrine. Infra Part I1A.
20 See Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic
Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1506-08 (1996) [hereinafter Adler, Wat's Left?]
(exposing conflicts within antipornography and anti-hate-speech theory).
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public importance.2' The need for scholarly attention to child
pornography law is even more acute because Congress's most recent
child pornography legislation " has produced conflicting circuit court
decisions;2' the Supreme Court has decided to review the legislation
next Tern.; As I will show, this legislation has extended the law of
child pornography in a direction that has sweeping constitutional
repercussions: by banning speech based on its social construction
effects, the legislation represents a sharp break with modern free
speech doctrine.
This Article seeks to establish child pornography law as a field of
First Amendment inquiry. By analyzing the complex body of child
pornography law as a whole, I show that its significance for all of free
speech is inescapable. Part I of this Article outlines the origins of
child pornography law and describes the social crisis around child
sexual abuse that has forced the law's growth. Part II analyzes the
expanding definition of "child pornography." Here I show that the
law has come to threaten a vast array of innocent and valuable
depictions of children. It has also become internally incoherent: the
definition of "child pornography" has come unmoored from the
central rationale that justified the creation of child pornography law
as a distinct constitutional category. Part III explores the radical
implications of child pornography law for the First Amendment. By
collapsing the "speech/action" distinction that occupies a central role
in the First Amendment, child pornography law has become the most
profoundly revolutionary realm of free speech law.
21 Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The issue is likely
to arise this Term, when the Supreme Court will hear an appeal from a Third Circuit
decision that reached a different result on a similar issue. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200
F.3d 109, 129 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that wire-tapping acts as applied against media
defendants violated the First Amendment), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2716 (2000).
2. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. IN 1998).
4 The First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have all upheld the Act. United States v.
Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11 th Cir. 1999); United States v. Carroll, 190 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.
1999), withdrawn in part and reinstated in part, 227 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit struck
dowm certain provisions of the Act last December. Free Speech Coalition X% Reno, 198
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 121
S. Ct. 876 (2001).
4 Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. at 876 (granting certiorari).
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I. CULTURAL PANIC AND THE BIRTH OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
"[I]f I have to choose between defending the First
Amendment and defending a child, I'll come down on
the side of the child."
-Wisconsin State Senator Alberta Darling '
Child pornography law arose in direct response to a cultural crisis:
starting in the late 1970s, child sexual abuse was "discovered" as a
malignant cultural secret, wrenched out of its silent hiding place and
elevated to the level of a "'national emergency.' 2, 6 At the center of
this dark secret lurked child pornography, the product, and some
27would say the cause, of child sexual abuse. As the Attorney General
reported, it was in the late 1970s when "awareness and concern about
child pornography escalated dramatically." 8
25 Mary Carole McCauley, A Fine Line Can Separate Art and Child Porn, MILwAUKEEJ.
SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1 (quoting State Senator Alberta Darling).
26 Ian Hacking, The Making and Molding of Child Abuse, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 253,
257 (1991) (quoting Martin Tolchin, U.S. Panel Declares Child Abuse Represents "National
Emergency," N.Y. TIIES, June 28, 1990, at B9); see also VIKKI BELL, INTERROGATING
INCEST: FEMINISM, FOUCAULT AND THE LAW (1993) (analyzing rising public anxiety
about child sexual abuse in the family); FLORENCE RUSH, THE BEST KEPT SECRET:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 5 (1980).
27 From the start, the Court viewed child pornography as a child abuse problem.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982) (describing the intrinsic relationship
between child pornography and child abuse). In Ferber, the Court approvingly quoted
one scholar who categorized child pornography as "'an even greater threat to the child
victim than ... [routine] sexual abuse.'" Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting David P. Shouvlin,
Preventing the Saual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535,
545 (1981)); see also WILLIAM A. STANMEVER, THE SEDUCTION OF SOCIEIY 88 (1984)
("Child pornography is the worst form of child abuse."). According to the Court, child
pornography documents an underlying act of abuse-the sexual use of a child. Ferber,
458 U.S. at 759 n.10. The recording of the act also becomes a collateral violation
against the child's dignity. The circulation of the pictures comes to "haunt" the child,
so that the initial act of abuse takes on a life of its own, exposing the child to perpetual
re-injury. Id. ("'Because the child's actions are reduced to a recording, the
pornography may haunt him in future years, long after the original misdeed took
place."' (quoting Shouvlin, supra, at 545)). The Court wrote that "the materials
produced are a permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the
child is exacerbated by their circulation." Id. at 759. The Court went on to explain
that the production of child pornography is a "low-profile clandestine industry" and
that the "most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be
to dr up the market for this material" by punishing its use. Id. at 760.
1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPI1, FINAL REPORT 408
(1986) [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]. In the early 1970s, child
pornography was an unknown genre: writing of Ferber in the 1982 Supreme Court Review,
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Congress quickly responded to these disturbing revelations." It
passed its first piece of legislation, the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act, in 1978, just a year after the news media
discovered the hidden crisis of child pornography!" At the time this
Act was passed, however, First Amendment law protected sexually
explicit speech unless it met the constitutional definition of
"obscenity." The Supreme Court defined "obscenity" in the 1973 case
of Miller v. California."' The three-part "Miller test" asks: (1) whether
the "average person" would find that the speech, "taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest" in sex; (2) whether it is "patently
offensive;" and (3) "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 2 The drafters of the
1978 Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act had
supposed that they were constrained by the Miller standard in their
Professor Fred Schauer remarked that "the phenomenon of child pornography is so
new that it would have been impossible to predict even ten years ago." Schauer, supra
note 15, at 311.
It is hard to state with confidence the actual statistics on the incidence of child
sexual abuse. The figures are so uncertain that a recent U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services survey of studies on child sexual abuse stunningly reported that
"rates for victimization for females range from 6 to 62 percent" of the population, and
for males "from 3 to 24 percent." KATHLEEN COULBORN FALLER, DEP'T OF HEALTH
AND HuNnN SERI'S., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
INTERVEN'TION AND TREATMENT ISSUES 16 (1996). A commonly cited figure is that one
out of three girls in the United States is sexually abused before the age of eighteen. See
ELLEN BASS & L-,URA DAviS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL 20 (2d ed. 1992) (providing
statistics on child sexual abuse). The New York Times recently reported that about 20-
25% of female adults have been sexually abused as children, up from an estimate of
18% in 1994. SeeJason DeParle, Early Sex Abuse Hinders Many Women on Welfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 1999, at 1. For further discussion of the conflict over statistics, see
Adler, Prverse Law, supra note 17.
Congress described its legislation as a response the "national tragedy" of child
pornography. H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 1 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492.
31 Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
2252, 2256 (1994 & Supp. I\V 1998)). Prior to 1977, only six states had provisions
specifically prohibiting the use of minors in obscene materials or performances. See
Tina M. Beranbaum et al., Child Pornography in the 1970s, in CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND
SEX RINGS 7, 7-10 (Ann W. Burgess ed., 1984) (exploring the impetus behind national
concern about child pornography in the 1970s). Now, all fifty states have child
pornography laws. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-20.1 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)
(listing statutes of forty-seven states). For the three states not listed, see N.Y. PENAL
LW §§ 263.00-.25 (McKinney 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-405 (Law. Co-op. 1999);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. xiii, §§ 2821-2826 (1998); see also JULIANN WHETSELL-MITCHELL,
RAPE OFTTHE INNOcENT 208 (1995).
A 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
'- Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
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approach to the problem of child pornography. The Act therefore
did not exceed the bounds of existing obscenity law.33
In 1982, the Supreme Court removed that barrier. That year a
unanimous Court (extremely rare in First Amendment cases)" decided
New York v. Ferber.35 The Court created a previously unknown exception
to the First Amendment, proclaiming that "child pornography" was a
new category of speech without constitutional protection.36 At issue was
a 1977 NewYork law that targeted child pornography. 7 The Ferber Court
encountered a novel First Amendment problem: whether nonobscene"
sexual depictions of children-speech not falling into any previously
defined First Amendment exception-could be constitutionally
restricted. The Court's answer was yes.39 "Child pornography" thus
joined a small and ragtag band of categories of expression that are
excluded from constitutional protection by reason of their content."'
The Ferber Court upheld a New York law that prohibited using a
child in a "sexual performance," meaning "'any play, motion picture,
photograph or dance"' which included "sexual conduct."41 "Sexual
33 The Act outlawed the use of children in the production of obscene materials. It
also enhanced the penalties for transmission or receipt of obscene materials that
contained depictions of children. Pub. L. No. 95-225 § 2, 92 Stat. 7 (1978). Congress
had rejected any measures that exceeded the scope of existing obscenity laws. See
AnnemarieJ. Mazzone, Comment, United States v. Knox: Protecting Children from Sexual
Exploitation Through the Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 167 (1994) (discussing congressional debates on whether Congress could
ban nonobscene child pornography).
34 Schauer, supra note 15, at 286.
35 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
36 Id. at 764. The Court's exclusion of certain categories of expression from
constitutional expression was most famously articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
37 Paul Ferber, who owned a Manhattan "adult" bookstore, had been arrested for
selling two films depicting young boys masturbating. Ferber was convicted under New
York statutes prohibiting nonobscene child pornography. The New York Court of
Appeals reversed Ferber's conviction, holding that the laws were unconstitutional
because they reached material that would be protected by the obscenity law standard
set out by the Supreme Court in Miller. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 751-52
(1982).
38 The materials at issue in Ferber had been found to be not obscene by the jury,
which was instructed to consider obscenity as well as child pornography charges
against the defendant. Id. at 751. Thus the issue for the Court was sharply defined.
39 Id. at 756.
40 For a classic discussion of categorical bans on speech, see Geoffrey R. Stone,
Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46
U. CHI. L. REv. 81,111 (1978).
41 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.00(1) (McKinney 1980)).
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conduct" was in turn defined to mean: "'intercourse, sexual bestiality,
masturbation, sadomasochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the
genitals."'4 2 In response to Ferber, Congress quickly passed legislation
modeled on the New York statute upheld in that case. The resultant
Child Protection Act of 198443 (and subsequent amendments)
44
Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
"Current federal law, following Ferber, has codified the definition as follows:
"sexually explicit conduct' means actual or simulated-(A) sexual intercourse,
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex; (B) bestiality; (C) masturbation; (D) sadistic or
masochistic abuse; or (E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (A)-(E) (1994). Unlike Congress's first legislation against
child pornography, passed in 1978, the 1984 Act explicitly changed the meaning of
"sexual conduct" to include certain nonobscene pictures of children. Id.
4 In 1986, Congress again amended the law to create two new offenses involving
advertising. Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100
Stat. 3510 (1986) (banning advertising the offering of child pornography for any type
of exchange and advertising seeking participation in any sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of creating child pornography). It also clarified that "visual depiction"
included undeveloped film and videotape, thereby codifying a decision in which the
Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant's argument that undeveloped film was not a visual
depiction. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 846-47 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1988,
Congress specifically outlawed the transmission of child pornography images by
computer. Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
690, § 7511 (b), 102 Stat. 4485. The 1988 Act also imposed extensive recordkeeping
requirements for producers of any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct that
was produced by materials mailed or shipped in interstate commerce. Id. § 7513(a).
Producers of such material were required to keep elaborate records about names and
ages of performers and to provide such information to authorities upon request. Id.
The Act was found unconstitutional because the requirements were not narrowly
tailored and "put as much, if not more, of a burden on reputable producers of adult
images than on the child pornography industry." Am. Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh,
713 F. Supp. 469, 479 (D.D.C. 1989). The court also found that the law's presumption
that the performers were underage if the records were unavailable or incomplete
violated due process. Id. at 480-81. Congress amended the Act to address concerns
raised by the court. See Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 311, 104 Stat. 4789, 4816 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2257(e) (1994)) (restoring the recordkeeping requirement). The government's
appeal from the district court's decision was dismissed as moot because of the changes.
Am. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The changes were
again challenged and found to be unconstitutional, Am. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F.
Supp. 412 (D.D.C. 1992), but the Court of Appeals reversed and determined that most
of the provisions were constitutional. Am. Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir.
1994). The Court of Appeals did find that the requirement that records be kept
indefinitely was unconstitutional and suggested a five-year limit. Id. at 91-92. The
court also found that photo developers are not "producers" of sexually explicit
material and therefore not subject to the recordkeeping requirements. Id. at 93.
Congress amended the statute again in 1996 to change the definition of child
pornography. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121,
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adopted most of this definition of "child pornography" from the
statute upheld in Ferber but changed the word "lewd" to "lascivious.",
Ferber relied on a rationale that was entirely novel within First
Amendment law: speech could be prohibited because of the
underlying crime that it depicted.46 The Ferber opinion repeatedly
emphasized the grievous harm caused to children who are abused in
the production of child pornography. 7 The circulation of the
resulting pictures compounded the harm by "haunting" the victims,
forcing them to relive their molestation.48 The Court concluded that
because it was so difficult to prosecute the "low-profile, clandestine
industry" of pornography production, the "most expeditious if not the
only practical method of law enforcement" to protect children was to
"dry up the market" by punishing the speech that resulted from the
110 Stat. 3009-26 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. IV 1998)); see infra notes 330-
33 and accompanying text. Congress also dispensed with its requirement that
prosecutions be for possession of "three or more items" containing child pornography.
The new law permits prosecution for possession of a single image.
45 This supposedly was in order to emphasize the distinction between child
pornography law and obscenity law, with which the term "lewd" is often associated. See
Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984); see also United
States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 830-32 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (discussing the Act).
The Act also raised the age of "children" for purposes of the law from 16 to 18.
The 1984 Act made other significant changes, such as increasing the maximum fines
tenfold and removing the requirement that the transmission or receipt of child
pornography be done for profit, thereby targeting the growing noncommercial
"cottage industry." Fines increased from $10,000 to $100,000 for a first offense. In
addition, the law clarified that purely textual pornography did not fall within the scope
of the statute; the language substituted "visual depiction" for "visual or print medium,"
which could be interpreted to include text:
[N]o reason for coverage of non-visual depictions was found in the legislative
history of the Act, and no need for such coverage has been identified in the 6
years of implementation of the Act. Rather than write in an obscenity
requirement for print material, it seems more approprite [sic] to simply limit
coverage to visual material."
H.R. REP. No. 98-536, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 494. The law
also added sections dealing with civil and criminal forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2253-2254
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Convictions rose dramatically under the revised law. During
the seven years the 1977 law was in effect, only twenty-three defendants were convicted
(all for the distribution rather than the production of child pornography). See H.R.
REP. No. 98-536, at 2 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 492, 493. In contrast, 214
defendants were convicted in the 28 months following the enactment of the 1984 law.
H.R. REP. No. 99-910, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5954.
46 Infra Part III.
47 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
48 Id. at 759 n.10.
INMERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
underlying crime."'
Just as child pornography law was created in response to a cultural
emergency, its expansion since Ferber has kept perfect pace with rising
societal anxiety about the subject of child sexual abuse. Declared a
"national emergency" in 1990,5 the crisis of child sexual abuse has
become an "obsession" in our culture and politics." As a media critic
reported in 1997: "No other crime so preoccupies the press."52 Some
scholars believe that we now live in a "culture of child abuse, ''53 that it
has become the master narrative of our culture.
In response to this "'ever-widening"' crisis," child pornography law
has undergone rapid growth through a combination of legislative
expansion and judicial interpretation. The expanding laws have led
to a surge in the number of child pornography prosecutions. For
example, since the early 1990s, the Department of Justice has tripled
the number of annual child pornography prosecutions it brings.5'
Id. at 760. In addition to this fundamental rationale, the Court articulated
other reasons why child pornography should be categorically excluded from First
Amendment protection. First, the Court noted the State's "'compelling'" interest in
"'afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor.'" Id. at 756-57
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). Second,
the Court noted that it was unlikely that any material of value would meet the
definition of "child pornography." Id. at 762. Third, the Court reasoned that since
advertising and selling child pornography were "an integral part of the production" of
the material, these activities could also be prohibited to protect children harmed in
the production. Id. at 761. Finally, the Court also noted its precedents, such as those
related to obscenity law, in which it had accepted categorical bans on certain types of
expression. Id. at 768-69.
Hacking, supra note 26, at 257.
Nancy Scheper-Hughes & Howard F. Stein, Child Abuse and the Unconscious in
Amrican Popular Culture, in THE CHILDREN'S CULTURE READER 178, 181-82 (Henry
Jenkins ed., 1998).
Richard Goldstein, The Culture of Child Abuse, VILLAGE VOICE, June 10, 1997, at
38.
Id.
Spe, ,.g., Scheper-Hughes & Stein, supra note 51, at 179 (describing "child abuse
as a key (or master) social problem of our times").
PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER
IN MODERN AMERICA 147 (1998) (quoting Ernest Volkman & Howard L. Rosenberg,
The Shaine of the Nation, FA.Ni. WVKLY.,June 2, 1985, at 4).
" Ron Scherer, New Vice Squads Troll the Web for Child Porn, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Dec. 17, 1998, at 1. From 1998 to 1999 alone, the FBI's Innocent Images
project doubled its prosecutions. See L. Scott Tillett, FBI Turning Internet on
Pornographow, FED. COMPUTER W-, Feb. 2, 2000, at http://fcw.com/fcw/articles/
2000/0131/web-fbi-02-02-00.asp, reprinted in NETWORK WORLD FUSION, Feb. 3, 2000, at
http://-wv.nwfusion.com/news/2000/0203fbinet.html, available at LEXIS, News
Library, NVIV File.
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To violate a child sexually is an "unspeakable" offense, the breach
of a supreme taboo.5' In our culture, child sexual abuse is the worst
crime we can imagine: it is, we hear repeatedly, "worse than
murder."58 Just as in prisons, where pedophiles are the most reviled
inmates, despised by all fellow criminals, so in society more broadly,
the pedophile now represents the ultimate in depravity-the
predatory59 "monster."60 A scholar writes that in our society,
pedophilia has come to occupy a "metaphysical status as the evil of all
evils."6'
Many cultural scholars contend that we have reached a level of
social "panic" on the subject of child sexual abuse and child
pornography. 62 But to say that our response has been marked by
57 The term "unspeakable" appears frequently to describe child sexual abuse. See,
e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S11,900 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Biden)
(stating that child pornography causes "a harm that is unspeakable").
KINCAID, supra note 9, at 16. Some legislative schemes have reflected the view
that child pornography is worse than murder. Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-
604.01 (B), (D) (Supp. 1993) (imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of twelve
years in prison for violation of child pornography law) (current version at ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 13-604.01 (D), (F) (Supp. 2000)), with id. § 13-710(A) (Supp. 1993) (imposing
a mandatory minimum penalty of ten years for second-degree murder).
59 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (upholding Kansas's
"Sexually Violent Predator Act," which provides for the indefinite civil commitment of
sexual "predators," such as the defendant in that case who had been convicted of
repeated child molestation).
60A common term used to describe pedophiles. See, e.g., RICHARD OFSHE &
ETHAN WATrERS, MAKING MONSTERS 8 (1994).
61 KIPNIS, supra note 10, at 5.
62 The word "panic" appears frequently in literature about the sexual abuse
movement. See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 55, at 221 (describing cyclic upsurges in child
abuse "panics"). The use of the term "panic" in this context tends to refer to "moral
panic" theory developed in the 1970s by British sociologists, most prominently Stuart
Hall. STUART HALL, POLICING THE CRISIS (1978); see also STANLEY COHEN, FOLK
DEVILs AND MORAL PANICS (1972) (applying moral panic theory to British youth
subcultures in the 1960s and 1970s); ERICH GOODE & NAcHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL
PANICS (1994) (describing several past social problems as moral panics).
The word "hysteria" also appears frequently in the literature and in popular
debate. See, e.g., Suzanne Sataline, Labs' New Role: Is It Filth on Film or Kids in the Tub?,
HARTFORD COuRANT, Mar. 29, 1992, at Al ("'We're getting into mass hysteria [on the
subject of child pornography]." (quoting arts lawyer H. Louis Sirkin)). In academia, a
group of scholars has formed, calling themselves the "new hysterians" (playing on the
humanities movement called "new historians"). These scholars share an interest in
modern outbreaks of mass hysteria, in which they include child sexual abuse as a
prominent example. See ELAINE SHOWALTER, HYSTORIES: HYSTERICAL EPIDEMICS AND
MODERN CULTURE 7-8, 12 (1997) (describing "new hysteria" studies of syndromes
including recovered memory of sexual abuse).
1INVERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
panic is not to deny the reality of the problem. 3 Rather, it seems that
there is, of course, a problem of child sexual abuse and that there is
also a panic surrounding it.
Child sexual abuse is a profoundly disturbing issue, one which
engenders an emotional and visceral reaction. In fact, a district court
remarked in a child pornography case that "[t]here is no subject which
elicits a more passionate response." a Others have cautioned that this
passion can lead to irrationality. One cultural scholar wrote: "For
what we can see very clearly in... debates over child pornography is
that logic cannot match... passion[] .... ,63 In a 1989 child porn-
ography case, Justice Brennan accused his colleagues of allowing their
"disquiet[ude]" about the problem of child pornography to override
their First Amendment principles.6 The former Solicitor General of
the United States concluded that "the issue of children and
pornography" is so "incendiary" that people cannot discuss it
rationally. 6"
What does it mean for a legal regime to have arisen in response to
such an emotional issue, a crisis surrounded by taboo, anguish, and
fear? How does the First Amendment fare when its doctrinal twists
and turns are used to combat the "worst of all possible evils?" Below, I
will argue that the passion and irrationality surrounding the problem
of child pornography have resulted in bad law: in order to fight this
most pressing of contemporary battles, we have distorted the First
Amendment.
, Note that statistics vary significantly. SeeAdler, Perverse Law, supra note 17, at 12.
United States v. Millard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 809 (D.N.J. 1988) (emphasis added).
See, for example, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), a case invohing the
sexual abuse of children in a day care center, where the heated emotional context of
the case may have swayed the legal response. The Court held that the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause did not require actual physical confrontation. Id.
at 857. As Justice Scalia said in dissent, remarking on the pressure exerted on the
Court by public horror over child sexual abuse: "Seldom has this Court failed so
conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of
preailing current opinion." Id. at 860.
- Anne Higonnet, Conclusions Based on Observation, 9 YALE J. CPrncisM 1, 11
(1996).
0 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 143-45 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
. Heilemann, supra note 1, at 53-54 (quoting former Solicitor General Drew
Days).
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II. THE INTERNAL INCOHERENCE OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
The sexual abuse of a child to create pornography is a repulsive
crime. That is something we can agree on. It is no wonder then that
we as a society have "declared war" on child pornography and that
Congress, prosecutors, and the courts have rushed into the battle. In
fact, it seems at times as if they have been striving to outdo one
another in being tough on child pornography, as if the interplay
between legislatures, prosecutors, and courts were a contest in moral
outrage.
This contest has revealed a strangely acquiescent Supreme Court.
Typically, in First Amendment decisions, when the Court eliminates a
category of expression from constitutional protection, it carefully
defines the speech that can be banned; the definition then serves as a
limit on legislative enactments. 9 This method recurs throughout free
speech jurisprudence. It is, for example, the approach taken by the
Court in the subversive advocacy cases, which evolved into the current
Brandenburg "incitement to imminent lawless action" standard.7" It is
also the approach that the Court used in its obscenity jurisprudence,
in which it struggled for years, beginning with Roth v. United States, to
create a precise constitutional definition of the "obscene."7'
In defining "child pornography," however, the Court has adopted
a peculiarly passive pose: since it first declared in the 1982 case of New
York v. Ferber that child pornography was a category of speech
unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court has never attempted
to define "child pornography" itself.72 Rather, it has merely upheld
69 The Ferber decision explicitly relied on the precedent of excluding whole
categories of expression from constitutional protection. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 754-55 (1982).
70 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("Constitutional guarantees of
free speech.., do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe the use of force... except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.").
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973); A Book Named 'John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418-20
(1966) (plurality opinion) (attempting to clarify the definition of "obscenity"); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957) ("Obscene material is material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."). In spite of this struggle, I view
the Court's obscenity jurisprudence as a failure. See Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modern
Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1362-65 (1990) [hereinafter Adler,
Post-Modern Art].
72 Cf Falon, supra note 18, at 896 ("Ferber... had failed to supply a formulaic
specification of the unprotected category .... ").
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the statutory definitions it has confronted.
One explanation for the Court's passive pose in defining child
pornography could be that it has so far only upheld child pornography
statutes, whereas in Brandenburg, for example, it invalidated a statute
and then devised a test for dividing protected and unprotected
speech. It is arguable that striking down a statute requires an
explanation of constitutional limits in a way that upholding a statute
might not. But this was not the case in Roth, the Court's first obscenity
case. Even though the Court upheld both the statute and Roth's
conviction under it, the Court nonetheless created a constitutional
definition of obscenity, one that it would revisit and reshape in later
73
cases.
The Court's approach to child pornography jurisprudence has
been remarkably different. Aside from declaring the requirement of a
few standard protective features (such as the requisite scienter 74 or the
need for a statute to specifically define the prohibited material ), the
Court has primarily accepted legislative enactments and then sought
to justify them within the First Amendment. With Congress and states
pushing further and further for limits on child pornography and with
prosecutors pressing the confines of the law, this lack of a clear
boundary-and the suggestion of some Justices that they would
entertain even broader definitions of child pornography than current
ones7' -' has made the Court's work seem like an invitation to statutory
expansion and prosecutorial enterprise.
A. The Law's Elusive Target
Although the Supreme Court in Ferber announced five reasons
7J Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 (defining "obscene material" as that which "deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest").
71 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (holding that it
was necessary to prove that the defendant knew that the children in the materials were
minors); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 (requiring some element of scienter to find criminal
responsibility for the distribution of child pornography, as there is for general
obscenity). The requirement of scienter is borrowed directly from obscenity law. See
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1959) (establishing obscenity law scienter
requirements).
'. Again this was not an innovation unique to child pornography law, but rather a
standard borrowed from obscenity law. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (stating that the
sexual conduct depicted must fall into a specifically defined category of material
prohibited by the state).
7. See infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
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supporting the exclusion of child pornography from First
778Amendment protection,7 7 the primary thrust78 of these rationales was
that child pornography must be prohibited because of the harm done
to children in its production.79 This notion-that the production of
child pornography requires an act of child abuse-was the key to the
Court's reasoning. 9 This urgent rationale-to protect children from
77 SeeFerber, 458 U.S. at 756. The five rationales set out in Ferberwere as follows:
1. The State has a "'compelling'" interest in "'safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor.'" Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
2. Child pornography is "intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at
least two ways. First, the materials produced are a permanent record of the children's
participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second,
the distribution network for child pornography must be closed" in order to control the
production of child pornography. Id. at 759 (citations omitted). The Court explained
that the production of child pornography is a "low-profile, clandestine industry" and
that the "most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be
to dry up the market for this material" by punishing its use. Id. at 760.
3. "The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive
for and are thus an integral part of the production" of child pornography. Id. at 761.
4. The possibility that there would be any material of value that would be
prohibited under the category of child pornography is "exceedingly modest, if not de
minimis." Id. at 762.
5. Banning full categories of speech is an accepted approach in First Amendment
law and is therefore appropriate in this instance. Id. at 763-64.
78 I will analyze below the other harms caused by child pornography and the other
rationales the Court used tojustify its exclusion from First Amendment protection. See
infra Part III.B.3.
79 The opinion repeatedly emphasizes this concern for the "welfare of children
engaged in [the] production" of child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. Indeed,
the Court framed the issue as whether "a child has been physically or psychologically
harmed in the production of the work." Id. at 761. The first three rationales address
this central harm. The fourth rationale goes to the assumption that the category of
speech in question is "low value;" banning it therefore presents little First Amendment
concern. The fifth rationale recognizes the Court's precedent of having banned whole
categories of speech before.
The view that child pornography is sexual abuse, that it is in fact the core of
sexual abuse, persists as the foundation of the approach taken by courts, legislators,
politicians, and the media. See 142 CONG. REc. 81,900 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Biden) ("At the heart of the analysis.., is a very straightforward
idea: Children who are used in the production of child pornography are victims of
abuse, plain and simple. And the pornographers, also plainly and simply, are child
abusers."); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 406 ("[C]hild pornography
is child abuse." (emphasis omitted)); see also 132 CONG. REc. S14,226 (daily ed. Sept.
29, 1986) (statement of Sen. Roth) ("[T]hose who advertise in order to receive or deal
in child pornography and child prostitution are as guilty of child abuse as the actual
child molester...."). The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography stated
that "child pornography necessarily includes the sexual abuse of a real child, and there
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abuse-explains why the Court's child pornography jurisprudence
departs so dramatically from the contours of obscenity law: obscenity
law is based on the worthlessness of certain expression,' whereas child
pornography law excludes speech because of the grievous crime from
which it stems.
Thus, unlike obscenity law, child pornography law makes no
exception for works of "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value." As the Court explained, a work may possess serious value, but
can be no understanding of the special problem of child pornography until there is
understanding of the special way in which child pornography is child abuse."
ATtORNEY GENERAL's REPORT, supra note 28, at 406. The abuse of an actual child is
"[tlhe distinguishing characteristic of child pornography." Id. at 405.
.' This is the fundamental principle of Roth v. United States, the Court's first
modern obscenity decision, in which it held that "obscenity" was a category of
expression that lacked First Amendment protection. 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
("[O] bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."); see
alo Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8-9
(analyzing the Roth decision). Nonetheless, this fundamental principle has been
compromised by later obscenity decisions. In Miller v. California, the Court held that
material did not have to be utterly worthless to be banished to the realm of the
obscene. Instead, it had to lack serious value. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). This change
meant that some valuable speech, not sufficiently "serious" in value, would be
unprotected. SeeAdler, Post-Modern Art, supra note 71 (criticizing the effect of this new
test on art).
,- Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. Although the Court has never entertained a child
pornography case in which serious value was raised as a defense, the Court's dicta in
Fibti seem to reject the idea of an exception for value. Ferber held that the lack of an
exception for serious value did not render the law so overbroad that it failed under the
doctrine of"substantial overbreadth." 485 U.S. at 766-74. Nonetheless, the concurring
opinions in Ferber suggest some discord on the question of serious value among the
members of the Court at the time of the 9-0 decision. For example, Justice O'Connor
wrote to emphasize that artistic value 'was irrelevant to the harm of child abuse that
child pornography law sought to eradicate: "[A] 12-year-old child photographed while
masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the community
labels the photograph 'edifying' or 'tasteless.' The audience's appreciation of the
depiction is simply irrelevant to New York's asserted interest in protecting children
from psychological, emotional, and mental harm." Id. at 774-75 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). In contrast, Justice Brennan assumed that serious artistic value would be
a valid defense in a case if it were raised. He wTote that harm to a child and value of a
depiction bear an inverse relationship to one another-. "[T]he Court's assumption of
harm to the child resulting from the 'permanent record' and 'circulation' of the
child's 'participation' lacks much of its force where the depiction is a serious
contribution to art or science." Id. at 776 (Brennan,J., concurring) (citation omitted).
In 1999, the First Circuit indicated that serious value would be a defense under the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 when the prosecution w-as based on virtual
child pornography that did not involve a real or recognizable child. United States v.
Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 1999). For criticism of the obscenity law standard of
serious" "artistic value," see Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note 71.
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that "bears no connection to the issue of whether or not a child has been
physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the work.""
Unlike obscenity law, child pornography law does not require the trier
of fact to judge a work as a whole, but allows a work to be evaluated in
isolated passages and out of context. Unlike obscenity law, child
pornography law allows for the prosecution of mere home possession,
as opposed to distribution or production, of a suspect picture. ' If the
State finds one photograph in a drawer in a defendant's home, that is
enough to convict.'s As the Court explained, the underlying crime of
child sexual abuse entitles the states to "greater leeway in the
regulation" of child pornography than of obscenity." This compelling
rationale justifies the extreme measures that child pornography law
permits.
83 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
84 In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court extended the reach of child pornography law in its
decision to uphold the criminalization of mere possession as opposed to distribution
or production of child pornography. 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (supporting the State
of Ohio's argument that "it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child
pornography problem by only attacking production and distribution"). Once again,
the Court relied on the unique rationale underlying child pornography law to justify
the decision, which rejected a basic tenet of obscenity law. privacy rights protect the
individual possessor of obscenity in his own home even though the material he
possesses is illegal to make or sell. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969) (holding that the government cannot prohibit mere possession of obscene
material), with Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109 ("The State does not rely on a paternalistic
interest in regulating Osborne's mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted [its law prohibiting
possession of child pornography] in order to protect the victims of child
pornography....").
85 In Osborne, the defendant possessed in his home four suspect pictures. 495 U.S.
at 107. Congress recently amended federal child pornography law to permit
prosecution for possession of a single image. Previously, the law required prosecutions
to be based on possession of "3 or more images" containing child pornography. 18
U.S.C. § 2252A, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 203(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1998) (replacing the phrase "3
or more images," each time it appeared, with the phrase "an image").86
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756. As the Fourth Circuit recently remarked, the
government interest in prohibiting obscenity "pales in comparison to its interest in
prohibiting" child pornography. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir.
2000).
The Seventh Circuit recently relied in part on the particularly compelling
rationale underlying the prohibition of child pornography to decide that a police
officer did not need a warrant before seizing alleged child pornography. United States
v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000). In Moore, the court distinguished Roaden
v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973), which held that the government must obtain a
warrant before seizing allegedly obscene material. Moore, 215 F.3d at 684-86. As the
Seventh Circuit explained in Moore, "[t]he application of child pornography standards
involves a more limited inquiry than [Miller v. California] requires and is within the
competency and experience of police officers .... Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
INVERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
But a strange thing has happened. As the crisis of child sexual
abuse has escalated, the definition of what constitutes "child
pornography" also has expanded dramatically, in a direction that
makes it increasingly unrelated to the harm that the law was designed
to combat. In fact, the direction of the law's expansion has rendered
it more constitutionally problematic from two different perspectives.
First, it presents obvious problems of vagueness and overbreadth,
thereby threatening a wide array of pictures of children that ought to
be protected. Second, as the definition has grown, it has become so
capacious that it allows for the prosecution of pictures in which there
was no underlying act of child molestation. Thus, the definition of
child pornography has evolved in a way that has less and less to do
with the atrocious danger that justified the law's novel and unyielding
ways. Its expansion has therefore rendered child pornography law
internally disjointed and constitutionally flawed.'
To illustrate the problem, imagine two different photographs.
The first is horrible: It depicts a naked ten-year-old girl being fondled
by an adult. The child had been kidnapped, imprisoned by an
underworld child sex ring, and used to make pornography." The
pornographers sell the picture to pedophiles around the world.
Now imagine a second photograph: It is taken while a ten-year-
old girl wearing a bikini plays on the beach with her mother.
Unbeknownst to either the girl or her mother, a man far away on the
beach has a camera with a telephoto lens. He takes a picture of the
little girl, zooming in on her genitals, which are covered only by her
bathing suit. The girl and her mother never see the man; they never
See infra notes 170-74 and accompanying text for discussion of overbreadth.
An alternative way to articulate this problem might be to say that the law is no
longer "narrowly tailored" to achieve its objective. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121-23 (1991) (finding the
New York "Son of Sam" law overinclusive because it targeted a broad range of speech
and was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve the State's objective). In his concurring
opinion in the Simon & Schuster case, Justice Kennedy argued that it was unnecessary
and incorrect to apply the language of narrow tailoring, borrowed from equal
protection doctrine, in the First Amendment context. Id. at 125 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (finding in the
context of an expressive conduct case that a statute is not narrowly tailored if "a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the statute's]
goals").
So', golerally Belanger et al., Typology of Sex Rings Exploiting Children, in CHILD
PORINOGA PI- AND SEx RINGS, supra note 30, at 51 (discussing various types of child
sex rings).
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know the photo has been taken. The photographer, who finds the
resulting picture sexually stimulating, keeps the photograph to
himself, in his secret stash of "child pornography." He never shows it
to anyone else.
This first photograph I described is precisely the kind of picture
that child pornography law was intended to combat: made under
horrifying conditions, the photograph is the result, and indeed the
goal, of a crime of child sexual abuse. It is the product of what the
Supreme Court labeled the "low-profile, clandestine" child
pornography industry.90 The content of the picture-a child being
molested-exemplifies the definition of "child pornography" as set
out in the Supreme Court's child pornographyjurisprudence.
But what about the second picture? The girl playing on the beach
with her mother was never attacked or abused. There is no
underlying harmful act to prevent. The girl in the first photograph
was held in sexual slavery and molested. The girl on the beach never
even knows of her violation. Far from being imprisoned in a "low-
profile, clandestine industry" of the sort the Court hoped to combat
through child pornography law, the girl was happily playing with her
mother, unaware that she entered the mind, let alone the lens frame,
of the photographer. We may not like that this picture has been
taken of the girl. And we may not like the way the photographer
thinks of the photo, nor the way he thinks of the little girl. These are
troubling concerns. But would it be correct to say that the picture is
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760.
91 Just the fact that the girl's picture has been taken without her consent seems
violative. Yet the law would not provide a remedy on that basis alone. Pictures taken
in public places, such as a beach, do not require consent or "release" by the subject.
Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482-83 (D. Me. 1987) (holding that
there was no invasion of privacy when a passenger on a cruise ship was photographed
against her will); Phillip G. Hassman, Annotation, Taking Unauthorized Photographs as
Invasion of Privacy, 86 A.L.R.3D 374, § 4 (1978).
92 There may be other reasons to restrict the photographer here, such as privacy
concerns. See infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text. Privacy concerns also play a
role in child pornography law, which considers the privacy harm that the girl would
suffer if the picture were circulated and if the girl were aware of the photograph's
circulation. If that were the case, the girl would be subject to the possibility of being
"haunted" by the existence of the photograph. This concern, as articulated by the
Supreme Court, does not seem present where, as here, the girl does not know of the
picture's existence and it is not circulated. Furthermore, since there was no
underlying act of abuse, it seems inaccurate to imagine that the girl would be haunted
by anything, since haunting implies a return of a previous experience of abuse and the
girl here has suffered no abuse. See infra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
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"child pornography" and to bring all the attendant severity of child
pornography law to bear on its possessor?"
The developments in the law of child pornography that I will
analyze below indicate that the answer is yes.94 These developments
have allowed for the prosecution of possessors of pictures such as the
second one described above, pictures taken with no underlying act of
abuse.
Why has the law expanded in this direction? The answer has to do
with the peculiar nature of pedophilic desire.' The problem is that
pedophiles like a far wider range of pictures than the explicit
pornography that must be produced through acts of abuse. 6
Pedophiles also like pictures of children just being children-doing
gynmastics and mirling batons, 7 playing in swimming pools and on
playgrounds, ' or even pictures of children bundled up in heavy
wrinter coats.
I do not mean to deny that the girl is "harmed." What I mean is that any harm
that she suffers is a different kind of harm from the one that child pornography law
was established to ward off.
I should also note that this picture arguably causes another kind of harm, one that
concerned the Ferber Court It is possible that the picture feeds the market for child
pornography, and that it should be banned to "dry up the market." Ferber, 458 U.S. at
7(A. I consider this argument infra in Part III.B.3 (reasoning that the market rationale
has diminished force in light of the expanded definition of child pornography)..,I should stress that in this hypothetical case, the photographer is clearly
vulnerable to prosecution under existing child pornography law, but that the law is
sufficiently fact-based and vague that the outcome of the prosecution is not assured.
&e infia notes 168-74 (discussing vagueness and overbreadth); see also Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 143 n.18 (1990) (Brennan,J. dissenting) (noting that the law does not
require the sho'ing of harm to the child).
"; For an argument that questions the coherence of the category "pedophile," see
Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 17.
... As the Ninth Circuit observed, "the type of sexuality encountered in pictures of
children is different from that encountered in pictures of adults." United States v.
Arnin, 900 F.2d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1990).
.,7 &Se, Brief for the United States at 4, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1993)
(No. 92-1183) (quoting catalogues from which the defendant Knox ordered
videotapes; the catalogue advertised videotapes of girls "performing baton twirling,
majorette and gymnastics routines").- Brief of National Law Center for Children and Families et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of the Respondent at Part IVC.ii, Knox (No. 92-1183) (noting that pedophiles
like pictures of children on playgrounds and in swimming pools).
Consider "Paidika," a self-described online "Journal of Paedophilia": its website
depicted not grotesque sex acts with children, but everyday pictures of kids. Padika
also provided links, for the interested pedophile, to Vogue Bambini, an Italian fashion
magazine for children's clothes. Paidika featured on its website a Vogue cover
depicting children wearing heavy winter coats. Paidika, Journal of Paedophilia, at
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In fact, the pictures that pedophiles enjoy and find sexually
stimulating are often the very pictures of children that society extols
and values. '0 Thus the Arizona Court of Appeals considered a child
pornography case in 1994 involving pictures of children in "normal
situations and poses," such as store advertisements and pictures of
girls in "ballet costumes and in dance class."' 01 The defendant had
admitted to sexually fantasizing about the images. One recent target
of a child pornography investigation was a photographer who
supposedly found sexual stimulation from pictures he took of "boys
walking to school and riding their bikes." 02 As a medical researcher
explained, some pedophiles "look at the children's underwear section
of a Sears catalogue and become aroused."0 3  An assistant state
attorney in Florida commented, "' [t] o most of us, a picture of a small
boy in a bathtub is OK. ... But... what is not pornographic to most
of us, is pornographic to [a pedophile]." 0 4
In fact, the mundane innocence of pictures is often their draw.',
Pedophiles may prefer "innocent" pictures.'6 For example, one
http://konpeito5.bekkoame.or.jp/ro/fresh/paidikaa (visitedJune 9, 1998).
100 After all, the best-selling greeting cards and advertisements use adorable
images of kids. See ANNE HIGONNET, PICTURES OF INNOCENCE: THE HISTORY AND
CRISIS OF IDEAL CHILDHOOD 7 (1998) ("Pictures of children are at once the most
common, the most sacred, and the most controversial images of our time."). Higonnet
writes: "Today, approximately half of all advertisement photographs show children.
The most successful commercial child photographers... sell millions of pictures.
Billions of amateur snapshots of children are taken each year .... " Id. at 9.
101 Arizona v. Gates, 897 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). The Arizona Court
of Appeals in Gates reversed the defendant's conviction, finding insufficient evidence
to sustain the conviction. The defendant admitted that he viewed the material and
fantasized about the girls while masturbating. Id.
102 Sataline, supra note 62.
103 JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED: SExUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 247 (1988).
104 Henry FitzgeraldJr., Judge Declares Search Legal, SuN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale,
Fla.), Dec. 6, 1995, at 3B (quoting Assistant State Attorney Bob Nichols).
105 See, e.g., Catherine Fitzpatrick, Mind Games, W. AUSTRALIAN, June 12, 1999, at 5
("Detectives across Australia have seized the most bizarre collections from the homes
of child molesters. Photo albums of what most would consider happy family snaps.
Carefully pasted scrapbooks from store catalogues.... [T]he normal-even
mundane-can take on pornographic significance in the sinister minds [of
pedophiles].").
See, e.g., MARINA WARNER, SIX MYTHS OF OUR TIME 59 (1994) (noting that
"Lewis Carroll's friends were undisturbed by his photographs of their children, while
some pederasts today, it seems, are kept very happy by Mothercare catalogues"). Of
course, courts insist that these types of pictures will not be declared child pornography.
See, e.g., United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 125 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "[c]hild
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distributor of child pornography advertised his wares, such as a
videotape of little girls wearing their panties and bathing suits, as "so
revealing it's almost like seeing them naked (some say even better) ... 7
According to certain theorists, the stimulation derived from a picture
can be inversely proportional to its overtly sexualized nature. It is
often the very innocence-the sexual naivet6-of the child subject
that is sexually stimulating.'"5 As a child pornography investigator
explained, "Seldom do photo labs-or investigators-find pictures that
are blatantly pornographic."' The Chief Postal Inspector testified
before Congress in 1995: "Often, we conduct searches in our
investigations and we find photographs of children who are not
involved in sexual activity.""" Yet the Inspector went on to describe
these nonsexual pictures as "photographs taken by pedophiles for
their own gratification.""' In fact, government investigators admit
that they have investigated pictures that "clearly have no sexual
content."
' 2
In 1986 the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
noted these problems in a footnote to its Report on Pornography:
There is also evidence that commercially produced pictures of children
in erotic settings, or in non-erotic settings that are perceived by some
adults as erotic, are collected and used by pedophiles .... [F]or
example, advertisements for underwear might be used for vastly
different puToses than those intended by the photographer or
publisher ....
Yet the Attorney General's Report also indicated that although it
pornography is not created when the pedophile derives sexual enjoyment from an
otherwise innocent photo" (internal quotation marks omitted)). But is this language
really meaningful? As we shall see, the process of determining whether a photograph
is child pornography has become dangerously circular and uncertain.
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 738 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
One writer reports that members of the "North American Man Boy Love
Association" or "NAMBLA" (an organization for pedophiles) find erotic stimulation by
watching children on network television, the Disney channel, and mainstream films.
As the writer puts it: "I had found NAMBLA's 'porn,' and it was Hollywood." KINCAID,
.upra note 9, at 115.
Sataline, supra note 62 (emphasis added).
Hearing on S. 1237 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995 Before the S. Judiciary




lit ATTORNE GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 407 n.71.
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was important to identify this kind of material, "[t]here is little that
can be done about" it."4 As we shall see, legislatures did not agree.
The push to criminalize this sector of "child pornography" was already
underway. Thus, the law presses inexorably in the direction of
prohibiting more and more of this speech that is susceptible to
alternate interpretations. And it chases a criterion-appeal to
pedophiles-that is a poor proxy for whether children were abused in
the production of the material.
The problem we confront in child pornography law is therefore
not the familiar free speech puzzle: that it is difficult to draw the line
between bad speech and good, that they exist on a hazy continuum.
Instead, the problem is that bad speech and good may often be one
and the same thing: the cute pictures of our children playing on
playgrounds or riding their bikes may be precisely the same pictures
that most appeal to the pedophile."5 In fact, the peculiar quality of
pedophilic desire may make the governance of child pornography an
impossible task. In the following Part, I explore how the law has
stretched to capture this elusive target of pedophilic desire, and how,
in doing so, it has come to threaten pictures of children that ought to
be protected.
B. The Expanding Definition of "Child Pornography"
1. Doctrinal Growth
The problem began in Ferber when the Supreme Court approved
the statutory definition of child "sexual conduct" that included not
only obvious sexual acts, such as "'intercourse, sexual bestiality [or]
sadomasochistic abuse,"' but also "'lewd exhibition of the genitals.'""'
It would seem to be a relatively straightforward task to determine, for
example, whether a photograph depicts a child engaged in
intercourse, and it would also seem obvious that a child pictured in
such a sexual act is the victim of abuse."' But what does "lewd
114 Id.
11 Pictures showing explicit sexual acts may exert a different kind of appeal.
116New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 751 (1982) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
117 Of course, children are not capable of giving legal "consent" to sex. I focus
here on prepubescent children, and leave aside the question of whether older
teenagers who engage in intercourse should sometimes be able to give legal consent.
"Child" as defined in child pornography law includes all persons under eighteen, yet
INIERTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
exhibition of the genitals" mean? How does it differ from an
"innocuous"" '  photograph of a naked child-a family photograph of a
child taking a bath, or an artistic masterpiece portraying a nude child
model? As I will explain below, it is at this margin of child pornography
law, where its prohibitions threaten "innocent" speech, that the law
poses the most significant danger of overbreadth and its resultant chill.
It is also where the law bears the least connection to its foundational
rationale. And yet, it is in this haziest realm that the definition of
"child pornography" has grown.
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts since Ferber have
tolerated statutes that define this margin of child "sexual conduct" in
increasingly broad and subjective terms. Each subtle reiteration of the
definition of "lewd" or "lascivious exhibition of the genitals" since Ferber
has expanded it."' If we pushed the case law to the extreme, it seems to
threaten all pictures of unclothed children, whether "lewd" or not, and
even pictures of clothed children, if they meet the increasingly hazy
definition of "lascivious" or "lewd."
a. Crininalizing Depictions of Child Nudity
First, there is the trend toward criminalizing depictions of child
nudity, even those depictions that are not "lascivious." Consider the
progression of the Supreme Court's child pornography cases. The
Ferber Court upheld a New York law that prohibited images of minors
showing "'lewd exhibition of the genitals.'"'20 Seven years later, in
the age of onset of puberty as well as the age of first intercourse have steadily declined.
SeJudy Licht, Moms and Daughters and Puben, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1999, at Health
19 (discussing the increasing number of girls as young as nine years old entering
puberty).
p r' Throughout, I use terms like "innocuous" or "innocent" to refer to pictures
that are not child pornography. But one point of this Article is to expose the very
difficulty of distinguishing the "innocent" and "innocuous" photograph from "real"
child pornography. These terms should therefore be read as placeholders for
conte.ted meaning. See Adler, What's Left?, supra note 20, at 1506-08 (contesting the
definitions of the words "pornography" and "art"). The Supreme Court has used these
terms to distinguish protected depictions of children from child pornography. See, e.g.,
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-14 (1990).
Ill These expansions have only exacerbated the vagueness and overbreadth that
were already present in the Ferber definition. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
I-xRv. L. REv. 4, 145, 148 (1982) (stating that "the [Ferber] Court left unanswered
precisely how to determine what speech is unprotected," and noting the "contradictory
definitions of the bounds of speech left unprotected after Ferber').
, Ferber,; 458 U.S. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw, § 263.00(3) (McKinney
1980)).
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Massachusetts v. Oakes, two members of the Court expressed approval
of a law that would have prohibited any depictions of child nudity, so
long as the law drew certain exemptions for a narrow range of "bona
fide... purpose(s)." 2' In Osborne v. Ohio the following Term, the
Court held constitutional a statute prohibiting child nudity if there
was a "graphic focus" on the genitals, a term that had previously been
"a stranger" to the Court's censorshipjurisprudence.'
This trend toward criminalizing depictions of child nudity is
particularly striking, given that the Court has repeatedly noted in its
speech cases that depictions of nudity are protected under the First
Amendment. The Court has consistently declared: "' [N] udity alone'
does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the
First Amendment." 3 This is supposedly so even in child pornography
law. Indeed, the Ferber opinion repeated the Court's mantra that
"nudity, without more is protected expression. In spite of this
language, the trend in child pornography cases has contradicted this
maxim.
Consider the differences between the statute upheld in Ferber in
1982 and the statute upheld in Osborne v. Ohio in 1990. Whereas Ferber
upheld a statute prohibiting, inter alia, pictures showing "'lewd
exhibition of the genitals,""2 the statute in Osborne prohibited pictures
depicting minors in "'lewd exhibition [s]"' of nudity or with "'a
graphic focus on the genitals."
' 26
This definition swept more broadly than Ferber in two respects.
First, Osborne introduced a new and vague standard: the "graphic
focus on the genitals" test. The standard invites prosecution of a
1 491 U.S. 576, 588-90 (1989) (ScaliaJ., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in partjoined by Blackmun,J.).
122 495 U.S. 103, 138 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
123 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (quotingJenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)).
124 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n.18 (citations omitted); see also United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 83-85 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
between "mere nudity" and "hard-core pornography"); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 932-33 (1975) (giving First Amendment protections in some circumstances to
the "'barroom' type of nude dancing"); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
212-14 (1975) (striking down a ban on nudity in drive-in movies even when nudity was
visible to passers-by).
125 458 U.S. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAw § 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
126 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 113 (quoting State v. Young, 525 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ohio
1988)). The defendant Osborne was convicted for possessing in his home four sexual
photographs of boys.
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picture in which a child's genitals appear at the center, regardless of
the "lasciviousness" of the depiction.' Thus, a finding of "graphic
focus" may depend on where a photographer aims his camera,
making a determination of constitutional protection depend on what
could be an accident of pictorial composition. Second, the Osborne
statute was broader than the one upheld in Ferber. Whereas Ferber
upheld a statute prohibiting "lewd exhibitions of the genitals," the
Ohio statute upheld in Osborne banned "lewd exhibitions of nudity."
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that there is a distinction of
constitutional dimension between these two standards. ' The latter is
certainly a more capacious definition, particularly in view of the fact
that the Ohio statute at issue defined "nudity" to include not only
genitals, but also buttocks and girls' breasts.
In fact, the Osborne Court went further. It suggested in dicta that it
would be willing to entertain in the future a much broader ban on
depictions of child nudity-to prohibit many such pictures even when
there was no hint of lewdness or lasciviousness. Two Justices had
previously introduced this view in Massachusetts v. Oakes,129 the child
pornography case heard the Term before Osborne. In Oakes, the Court
had confronted the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statutory
definition of child pornography, but a plurality found that the
question was moot due to legislative revision.' Although Oakes
r 7 See, e.g., United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding
that a picture does not constitute child pornography, in part because the girl's
"genitals are not featured in the center of the composition").
N, To justice Brennan, this was a move toward prohibition of simple nudity, which
is traditionally protected. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This
prohibition, in his view, rendered the law substantially overbroad. Id. at 138-39. The
Ohio statute at issue provided certain exceptions for "bona fide" depictions of child
nudity, specifically: "bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious,
governmental, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist,
sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or research, librarian,
clergyrnan, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material
or performance." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(A)(3) (a) (West 1989). In
Brennan's view, this definition of proper purposes was far too narrow to protect
legitimate depictions of children. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 126-27 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the statute was vague and overbroad).
, 491 U.S. 576, 588 (1989) (Scalia & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
U11 Oakes was convicted under a Massachusetts law and sentenced to ten years for
taking topless pictures of his fourteen-year-old stepdaughter. Oakes appealed his
conviction, bringing an overbreadth challenge to Massachusetts law section 29A, which
prohibited posing or exhibiting children in a "'state of nudity"' and set forth certain
exceptions to the law for "'bona fide purposes.'" Id. at 578-79 (plurality opinion)
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produced no majority holding on the validity of the definition of child
pornography, the various opinions revealed the Court's thinking on
how it might expand this definition in the future. 3 ' Justice Scalia,
writing for himself and Justice Blackmun, indicated that had the
Court reached the question of the law's validity, 3' he would have
upheld the extremely broad child pornography statute at issue, a
statute that prohibited nothing more than permitting a child "to pose
or be exhibited in a state of nudity."' Scalia argued that the statute
was constitutional on its f-ace, in part because it made certain
exceptions for material that was produced for a limited set of defined
"bona fide purposes." 35 As Justice Brennan argued in dissent, these
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (1986)).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down section 29A as overbroad and the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. But after the U.S. Supreme Court had granted
certiorari and before the case was heard, the Massachusetts legislature amended
section 29A in two important respects. First, the legislature added a "lascivious intent"
requirement to the nudity portion of the statute. Second, it eliminated the exceptions
that the law had provided for bona fide purposes. Since the sole question on which
the Court had granted certiorari was overbreadth, and not the issue of whether the
statute violated Oakes's First Amendment rights as applied to him, the legislature's
subsequent amendment of the statute raised the problem of mootness. In an opinion
byJustice O'Connor, fourJustices found that the legislative amendment of section 29A
had mooted the overbreadth issue and voted to remand the case for the as-applied
challenge. FiveJustices disagreed and found that the case was not moot and ventured
on to analyze the original section 29A. Justice Scalia's opinion argued that the Court
should have reached the overbreadth issue and furthermore that the original statute-
prohibiting displays of child nudity if exceptions were drawn for "bona fide
purposes"--was not overbroad. In Scalia's view the statute's "legitimate scope vastly
exceeds the illegitimate." Oakes, 491 U.S. at 588 (Scalia & Blackmun,JJ., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
131 For an excellent discussion of Oakes and of the overbreadth doctrine in
general, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE LJ. 853
(1991). See also Tim Moran, First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine-Massachusetts v.
Oakes, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 221 (1990).
12 491 U.S. at 58590 (Scalia & Blackmun, _J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
133 Scalia argued that the Court should have reached this issue and that
subsequent legislative revision did not moot the overbreadth analysis. For further
discussion of overbreadth, see infra Part II.B.3.
13 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 29A (1986) (emphasis added).
133 Does the statute's exemption for proper purposes cure the potential
overbreadth? Certainly, on its face, this exemption only protects a very narrow sector
of speech. Consider, for example, the issue of artists who depict child nudity. The
standard proffered by Massachusetts would have been significandy harder to meet than
even the difficult "serious value" prong of the Miller test for obscenity. Miller already
neglects to protect a significant amount of art. See Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note
71, at 1359 (arguing that contemporary art rejects the very idea of "serious artistic
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bona fide purposes were so narrowly drawn that they would rescue
from the reach of the statute no more than a small fraction of
legitimate depictions of children.
Only two Justices adhered to this view in Oakes. Yet, in Osborne, a
majority of the Court relied on Scalia's Oakes opinion to "hint[] " "
that a similar provision in the Osborne case might well have passed
constitutional muster had it been directly before the Court. The Ohio
statute at issue in Osborne had, on its face, prohibited all nude
photographs of minors, making only narrow exceptions for certain
"proper purposes.""7 Although the issue before the Court was the
statute as narrowly construed by the Ohio Supreme Court-banning
only "lewd" depictions of nudity-Justice White, writing for the
majority, nonetheless opined on the statute as written. He suggested
in dicta that "the statute may not be substantially overbroad under our
cases" and cited Justice Scalia's opinion in Oakes as the only authority
for this position.' Thus, both Oakes and Osborne contain suggestions
that the Court may be willing to allow for the criminalization of
depictions of mere child nudity, without any trace of lasciviousness or
lewdness, so long as a statute draws certain narrow exceptions for
work that has been specifically produced for institutions such as
museums and schools.
b. Criminalizing Pictures of Children Wearing Clothes
Developments in the lower courts indicate that even pictures of
value" and therefore renders obscenity law obsolete). In contrast, the Massachusetts
law's bona fide defense was available only to those artists who produced their work for
"an educational or cultural purpose for a bona fide school, museum or library." MASS.
GEN. Liws ch. 272, § 29A (1986). Although many artists may dream of someday
producing their work for a museum, surely that is a privilege available to only a few,
and only in the unusual circumstance of a commission. For new, undiscovered, or up-
and-coming artists, this law offers no protection at all. This problem is more dramatic
when viewed in light of the statute's prohibition on posing a child in a state of nudity.
As Justice Brennan noted, the history of art contains numerous examples of great
painters, from Donatello to Renoir to Degas, who "worked from models under 18 years
of age." Oakes, 491 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, unlike Ferber, which
reached only photographic or filmic depictions of children, the statute in Oakes would
have extended to a broad array of art works, such as painting and sculpture, which
were produced using child models.
I,* Osb-o-ne, 495 U.S. at 127 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
takin such an approach).
id.
'" Id. at 112 & 113 n.9 (majority opinion) (citing Oakes, 491 U.S. at 589-90 (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
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clothed children may be termed "child pornography." In the 1994
case of United States v. Knox, the Third Circuit held that a depiction
could constitute a "lascivious exhibition of the genitals" even if a child
is wearing clothes that cover the genitals." 9 The defendant, Knox, had
purchased videotapes in which the videographers had zoomed in on
the genital areas of clothed girls. The Third Circuit approved Knox's
conviction under federal law, deciding that the definition of "child
pornography" did not require child nudity. The Circuit held its
ground, even after the Supreme Court remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of a brief submitted by the Solicitor General
of the United States in which he argued that the Circuit had gone too
far and that the statute required at least "discernibility" of the genitals
if not outright nudity.140
2. Doctrinal Confusion: The Circular Meaning of "Lasciviousness"
If nudity is no longer a requirement under the child pornography
laws, then it seems that a great deal turns on the meaning of the word
"lascivious."1 41 Although lower courts have universally adhered to a
standard definition of the word, a closer examination of the cases
reveals startling uncertainties at the core of the definition.
89 32 F.3d 733, 736-37 (3d Cir. 1994); accord United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781,
790 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a "reasonable jury could conclude that the
exhibition of the pubic area was lascivious" in beach scenes of girls wearing swimsuit
bottoms).
140 The Knox case caused a "political firestorm"; it prompted front-page headlines,
a resolution passed by members of Congress condemning the Solicitor General's
interpretation, and the unusual step of the members of Congress filing a brief in the
case. For a discussion of the "torrent of political outrage," see Eric M. Freedman, A Lot
More Comes into Focus Wen You Remove the Lens Cap, 81 IOWA L. REv. 883, 929-30 (1996).
See also Lawrence A. Stanley, The Child Porn Storm, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1994, at C3
(describing, in an op-ed piece by Knox's attorney, the "Capitol Hill Stampede" caused
by Knox); Pierre Thomas, Reno Takes Tougher Stance on Child Pornography, WASH. POST,
Nov. 11, 1994, at A3 (describing U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno's submission of a
brief agreeing that federal law bans lascivious exhibitions of children's clothed
genitals).
141 'Lasciviousness" is determinative, unless the Court were to accept the direction
it has suggested and to allow for restrictions on all depictions of child nudity, whether
or not lascivious, except when they are produced for "proper purposes" such as
museum displays. As I described, both Oakes and Osborne contain some suggestions
that if there is nudity, lasciviousness may not be necessary for a finding of child
pornography, so long as there are exceptions for proper purposes. Yet even if the
Court were to agree with the holding in Knox, it seems unlikely that the Court would
allow the criminalization of material depicting clothed children with no finding of
lasciviousness or lewdness.
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The leading case on the meaning of "lascivious exhibition" is United
.States v. Dost, a California district court case that announced a six-part
test for analyzing pictures." 2 The test was affirmed in a Ninth Circuit
decision.'" Mirtually all lower courts that have addressed the issue have
embraced the so-called "Dost test." The test identifies six factors that are
relevant to the determination of whether a picture constitutes a
"lascivious exhibition":
1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's
genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is
sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with
sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or
in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) whether the
child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the visual
depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual
activity; 6) whether the visual de iction is intended or designed to elicit
a sexual response in the viewer.
In my judgment, the Dost test has produced a profoundly
incoherent body of case law.14 5 I analyze two overlapping problems
" 1-, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), affd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812
F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987). Dost has been adopted by the First Circuit in United States v.
Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1999) (emphasizing that factors are "neither
comprehensive nor necessarily applicable in every situation"), the Third Circuit in
Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 (adhering to the view that a lasciviousness inquiry requires the use
of the Dost factors), the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 448 (5th
Cir. 1987) (affirming use of factors without specifically citing Dost), the Eighth Circuit
in United States v. Hoin, 187 F.3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that "[w]e find
helpful the six criteria" in Dost), and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Wof 890 F.2d
241, 244-46 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying the Dost factors). Numerous district courts have
followed Dost, as have many state courts. See, e.g., State v. Saulsbury, 498 N.W.2d 338
(Neb. 1993). I have not found a single case in any jurisdiction in which a court
mentions the Dost factors and declines to follow them. In spite of the universal
adherence to the Dost test, a closer examination of the cases reveals troubling
uncertainty about the proper meaning of "lascivious."
Wiegand, 812 F.2d at 1239.
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832. The test does not require that all factors be met to
find that a depiction is a lascivious exhibition; nor are the factors meant to be
exhaustive. See id. ("[T]he determination will have to be made based on the overall
content of the visual depiction, taking into account the age of the minor.").
14' Dost presents more problems of vagueness than the two I analyze below. For
one example of how easily manipulated the test is, see Statev. VanderLogt, No. 96-2015-
CR, 1998 WL 315960 (Wis. Ct. App. June 17, 1998), where the court considered a
picture of the defendant lying in bed with two sixteen-year-old girls. The court noted
that although "neither of the females [were) naked below the waist," the picture still
constituted a "lewd exhibition of the victims' genitals." Id. at *5. Because the adult
defendant was nude, the court concluded that "the exhibition of [the defendant's]
naked genitals necessarily drew attention to the genitals of the semi-nude females in
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below: first, the requirement that we consider the pedophile's
perspective in evaluating pictures; second, the interpretive bounds of
the inquiry.
a. The Pedophile's Perspective
In deciding if a picture contains a "lascivious exhibition of the
genitals," a threshold question presents itself: does "lascivious"
describe the child depicted, the photographer, or the viewer? In the
Knox case, Solicitor General Drew Days had argued that the term
"lascivious" must mean that the child depicted is "lasciviously
engaging in sexual conduct (as distinguished from lasciviousness on
the part of the photographer or consumer).""" Otherwise, Days
reasoned, there is no child "sexual conduct," which is what child
pornography law purportedly combats. The Court in Ferber had been
clear: "the nature of the harm to be combated requires that the...
offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by
children."
147
The Third Circuit disagreed with Days's argument, holding that
"lasciviousness" has nothing to do with the actions of the child.
Instead, the court held that lasciviousness describes material
"presented by the photographer [so] as to arouse or satisfy the sexual
cravings of a voyeur."'' As the Ninth Circuit explained in the case
affirming Dost, "lasciviousness is not a characteristic of the child
photographed but of the exhibition" set up for the photographer and
pedophilic viewers.1
bed with him" and thus constituted a "lewd exhibition of the victims' genitals." Id.
The subjectivity in the second factor of the test, which probes whether the setting
is "sexually suggestive," was demonstrated in a recent First Circuit case. See Amirault,
173 F.3d at 33 (concluding that the photograph at issue did not contain a "lascivious
exhibition of the genitals"). There, the court rejected the government's rather
startling assertion that the setting of photographs of children on a beach was sexually
suggestive because "many honeymoons are planned around beach locations." Id.
(internal quotation omitted).
146 Brief for the United States at 9, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939 (1995)
(No. 92-1183).
147 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (emphasis omitted).
1 Knox, 32 F.3d at 747 (approving, on remand from the Supreme Court,
Wiegand's interpretation of the Dost factors).
United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987). Courts have
wavered on the question of whether the focus must be on the audience, the
photographer, or both. At one point in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, for example, the
court suggested a subtle variation on this interpretation, focusing exclusively on the
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Application of the Dost test thus requires an inquiry into the
intended effect of the material on an audience of pedophiles. The
sixth and most important Dost factor asks if the picture is "designed to
elicit a sexual response in the viewer.""" Our concern is not with the
sexual response of the average viewer, but of the pedophile viewer. As
the Ninth Circuit explained, we must evaluate the lasciviousness of the
photographer and an "audience that consists of himself or like-minded
pedophiles."', We must focus on the photographer's "peculiar lust."
5 2
But how are we to get inside the head of the pedophile and to see
the world from his eyes?" 3 We face the daunting interpretive difficulty
of ascertaining exactly how a pedophile sees (not to mention the
difficulty of ascertaining the viewpoint of a "necrophilic pedophile," as
the government urged in one case).5 This focus on a deviant's
reaction is dramatically different from obscenity law, which, for all its
photographer rather than on the audience. It held that one of the pictures at issue
"as a lascivious exhibition because the photographer arrayed it to suit his peculiar
lust." Id.; cf. United States v. Mr. A, 756 F. Supp. 326, 329 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (applying
the Doq factors and stating that the "motive of the photographer and intended
response of the viewer [were] relevant" to the court's determination of lasciviousness).
The reluctance of the courts to acknowledge the potential gap between the
photographer's supposed desire and that of the pedophile viewer only exacerbates the
complexity of child pornography law. Must the photographer himself be sexually
stimulated by the picture? Must it be "arrayed to his peculiar lust"? Or may a non-
pedophilic photographer nonetheless create child pornography if he intends his work
to appeal to pedophiles despite its lack of appeal to him? By focusing on the perverted
photographer, the standard interpretation seems to exclude this latter possibility,
thereby being curiously underinclusive. The standard overlooks a fundamental aspect
of interpretation that is especially relevant in child pornography: intent and effect
may be completely disjointed. See generally Adler, 11%at's Left?, supra note 20, at 1560-65
(discussing the irrelevance of intent to harm). Of course, it is probably a hopeless task
to uncover the "true" intent of a photographer. See Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note
71, at 1375-76 (discussing the difficulties that courts would encounter if the intent of
an artist were the standard for distinguishing art from pornography). But even
assuming intent were utterly transparent, the problem remains that the
photographer's intent is often irrelevant to the effect of a picture, as pedophiles'
affinity for Sears catalogues demonstrates.
Amirault, 173 F.3d at 34. The First Circuit termed this "the most confusing and
contentious of the Dost factors." Id.; see supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text
(discussing the interpretation of the word "lascivious").
i7egand, 812 F.2d at 1244 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the unintended consequences of this inquiry, see Adler,
Perwerse Law, supra note 17.
1 Foster v. Virginia, No. 0369-87-2, 1989 WL 641956, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 21,
1989).
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complications, 155 at least rests on the viewpoint of the "average person"
in asking whether the material "appeals to the prurient interest" or is
"patently offensive."'5 6
Child pornography law's focus on the perspective of the
pedophile creates a further problem: as explained above, pedophiles
like so many pictures of children. The problem is evident in a recent
Seventh Circuit opinion, which analyzed photographs of two young
boys naked in the Australian wilderness. One photograph depicted a
boy walking across a stream; the other showed a boy climbing a tree.
Although it found that neither photo "appear[s] to depict sexual
activity or sexuality," the Court still concluded that the pictures seemed
"designed to provoke a sexual response."157
In fact, it is arguable that when viewed from the perspective of
pedophiles, all children could be erotic. Consider the implications of
the argument made to the Supreme Court in Knox by amici:
Because lasciviousness should be examined in the context of pedophilic
voyeurs, this Court should view visual images of young girls in
playgrounds, schools, and swimming pools as would a pedophile.
Pedophiles associate these settings with children, whom, to pedophiles,
are highly eroticized sexual objects. It therefore follows as a matter of
course that viewing videocassettes of the genitalia of young girls in these
a5 Obscenity law has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the "utter
bewilderment" caused by obscenity law); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Miller standard is vague,
fails to provide adequate notice, will chill protected speech, and will mire courts in
case-by-case litigation); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
178 (1982) (noting obscenity regulation's history of plain errors in banning what we
now consider great works of art).
156 In this respect, child pornography law appears to have revived a version of the
long discredited test for obscenity, which allowed material to be judged based on its
effect upon particularly susceptible persons. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R-Q.B. 359 (1868).
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the standard of the "average" or
"normal" person in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957), which rejected
the Hicklin test. The standard has since persisted in obscenity law. But see Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966) (adjusting the "prurient appeal" prong of the
obscenity test to focus on appeal to a "clearly defined deviant sexual group").
In Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), the Court determined that Millers third
prong, which tests for serious value, should be governed not by an "average person"
standard, but by a "reasonable person" standard. Id. at 500-01. The decision seems to
assume that the average person is not necessarily a reasonable person, or at least that
there is a significant distinction between the average person and the reasonable one.
157 United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
The question before the court was whether the photos provided probable cause for an
arrest on child pornography charges.
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settings permits the pedophile to fantasize about sexual encounters with
them.
The Third Circuit apparently accepted this argument after the
Supreme Court remanded the case. In examining the videotapes of
clothed girls, the court found it significant that "[n]early all of these
scenes were shot in an outdoor playground or park setting where
children are normally found." " The court specifically, though not
exclusively, relied on this fact in concluding that the material in
question was child pornography that "would appeal to the lascivious
interest of an audience of pedophiles. " s According to this logic, a
place "where children are normally found" is now suspiciously erotic.
This approach threatens protected speech-normal depictions of
children. It is also another way in which the test for child
pornography has become divorced from the rationale for banning it.
The question of whether a photograph appeals to a pedophile often
bears no relationship to the conditions under which it was produced
or to the experience of the child subject.
b. "Four Corners" or Context and Use?
What evidence are we to consider in determining the intended
effect of a picture? Courts have taken two different approaches to the
inquiry. On the one hand, most courts state that the intended effect
of a picture is evident in the picture itself. The reaction of the
defendant who possessed the picture is irrelexant. On the other hand,
there are courts that rely on evidence of the actual response of the
defendant to a picture as exidence of its intended effect. Some courts
purport to follow the first standard, but in actual practice follow the
second. In my judgment, both standards are deeply flawed.
The leading case for the first approach is United States v. Villard, a
1989 Third Circuit opinion.)' This opinion articulates the idea that
V, Brief of National Law Center for Children and Families et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Respondent at Part RI.C.ii, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939
(1993) (No. 92-1183) (citations omitted). Amici argue at another point that "it is
crucial for the Court to understand that the production, distribution, and receipt of
child pornography are accomplished by pedophiles. Because each of the persons
involved xiew children as sexual objects, they react much differently to videotapes such
a-s [those in question] than would a non-pedophile." Id. at Part III.
Knox, 32 F.3d at 747.
'a Id.
Unite'd States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1989).
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child pornography inheres in a photo. The court explained: "'Child
pornography is not created when the pedophile derives sexual
enjoyment from an otherwise innocent photo....' We must,
therefore, look at the photograph, rather than the viewer."'162 As the
First Circuit recently explained, citing Villard, any approach that
looked beyond the four corners of the photograph would be
unacceptable because it would mean that "a deviant's subjective
response could turn innocuous images into pornography."' 3 Thus,
the court announced that "the focus should be on the objective
criteria of the photograph's design."164
This first approach presents an appealing fantasy of stable pre-intepretve . 165
interpretive meaning. It is, unfortunately, interpretively incoherent,
at least when applied to photos that do not depict explicit sex acts, but
are instead evaluated for their "lasciviousness." Although the
comparison is exaggerated, to say that lasciviousness inheres in such
pictures of children is a bit like saying that the meaning of a
Rorschach test inheres in the blots. How can lasciviousness inhere in
a photograph when we have agreed that the lasciviousness must not
be an attribute of the child pictured, but of the photographer and
viewer? By this definition, lasciviousness exists outside the bounds of
the picture, in the eyes of the beholder. The Villard standard requires
us to look at the photograph as a self-contained universe, but at the
same time, the rest of child pornography law requires us to assume
162 Id. at 125 (quoting United States v. Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 812 (D.N.J.
1988)). The First Circuit recently followed Villard in United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d
28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999), finding that a photograph of a young naked girl on the beach
did not contain a "lascivious exhibition of the genitals." See also Faloona v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1341, 1360 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (stating that nude pictures of
children did not constitute child pornography merely because they were republished
in a "raunchy" magazine), affd, 799 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1986); People v. Lamborn, 708
N.E.2d 350, 355 (Ill. 1999) ("[Wlhether defendant was aroused by the photographs is
irrelevant in determining whether the photographs are lewd .... [The inquiry must
focus] on the photograph itself, not on the effect that the photograph has on an
individual viewer.").
163 Amirault, 173 F.3d at 34.
164 Id. at 35 (citations omitted).
165 Although this approach sounds appealing, it rests on the naive hermeneutic
assumption that the meaning of a picture can be divorced from its context, that every
picture has a true fixed interpretation. Of course, this is impossible. How can
meaning exist outside of interpretation? Our view of the meaning of a photograph
changes all the time. Cf JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 46-47 (Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976). See generally SUSAN SONTAG, ON PHOTOGRAPW'
(1979).
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that pedophiles see differently, and that their viewpoint, not ours,'"
must govern our interpretation of pictures. It is contradictory to
require a determination based on the "objective criteria of the
photograph" on the one hand, and on the other hand, to insist that
the subjective deviant viewpoint must control our reading.
The second approach courts have taken-looking at the actual
effect of material on its viewer in order to determine intended
effect-is circular. Consider, for example, a Tennessee state court
decision that follows this approach. Using a hidden camera, the
defendant secretly made a tape of two little girls taking a bath
together. Presumably the contents of the tape-though obNiously not
the circumstances of its making-were innocent and everyday; it
depicted nothing more than two girls going through the routine of
their bath, unaware of the defendant's actions. What the defendant
did to take the picture is repugnant. But putting aside, for a moment,
his intent in making the tape, is it right to call the tape itself "child
pornography"? The Court answered "yes." It based its decision in
part on evidence that the "[d] efendant viewed the videotape before
engaging in sexual relations with [his adult girlfriend]."67 Under this
standard, an everyday image can be child pornography because a
pedophile found it sexually stimulating. Unfortunately, many courts
covertly fall back on this standard.
Even those courts that cite the Villard approach nevertheless revert
to this practice. For example, the Third Circuit in Knox cited Villard,
and yet departed from it without acknowledging that it was doing so.
To determine whether videotapes of young girls were child
pornography, the court observed the defendant's sexual excitement
in his labeling of the tapes. As the court explained, on one of the
tapes, "Knox wr-ote '13-year old flashes' followed by 'hot."'' 8 How did
the Court know the material was child pornography? In part, because
1I am assuming here, for the sake of argument, that there is a clear divide
between pedophiles and non-pedophiles. I have, however, contested the clarity of that
distinction. See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 17, at 42-52 (arguing that mainstream
popular culture increasingly uses the erotic appeal of children and that legal culture
unwittingly replicates and spreads the perspective of the pedophile).
1,7 State v. Dixon, C.C.A. No. O1COI-9802-CC-00085, 1998 WL 712344, at *2
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 13, 1998).
1- Knox, 32 F.3d at 754. According to the court, Knox's descriptions of the tapes
was one factor that "clearly demonstrate[d] that Knox was aware that the videotapes
contained sexually oriented materials designed to sexually arouse a pedophile." Id.
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Knox thought it was "hot' 9
The same circularity of reasoning surfaces at other points in the
opinion. In reaching its conclusion that videotapes were intended to
appeal to a pedophile even though the children were wearing clothes,
the court writes: "Although the genitals are covered, the display...
apparently still provides considerable interest and excitement for the
pedophile observer, or else there would not be a market for the tapes
in question .... ."0 In this view, the question of what the material is is
inseparable from the way the material is responded to by
pedophiles.
171
Given that everyday pictures of children can also hold sexual
appeal for pedophiles, a focus on a photograph's use means that all
pictures of children can become suspiciously erotic if they are in the
hands of a pedophile. The circularity becomes dizzying: "child
pornography" is defined as pictures that appeal to a pedophile and a
"pedophile" is defined as someone who likes child pornography. The
pedophile becomes a nightmarish sort of King Midas: everything he
touches turns to smut.
Can we argue that this approach is limited because it only applies
to pedophiles? No. Consider how we identify pedophiles. Obviously,
when someone has molested a child, the question is not relevant. But
what about a parent who is accused of child molestation because of
snapshots she has taken of her own children? In some cases like this,
parents are not suspected of pedophilic abuse until the discovery that
they possess alleged child pornography. In one recent New Jersey
case, for example, a man took pictures of his five year old daughter.
72
The photo development lab thought that the pictures were suspicious
and the pictures were asserted to be pornographic. The man was
accused of pedophilia. The labels "pedophile" and "child
pornography" depend on one another: "Child pornography" means
169 See also United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that
the blurb accompanying a photograph of naked girls described the photos as "mostly
above-the-waist (but ever-so-erotic)").
170 Knox, 32 F.3d at 745.
171 For criticism of this approach, see United States v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st
Cir. 1999), in which the court reasoned that if the defendant's "subjective reaction
were relevant, a sexual deviant's quirks could turn a Sears catalog into pornography."
172 See Doreen Carvajal, Photographer Focuses on His Year of Pain: Assails Treatment over
Nude Photos, N.Y. TmIES, Mar. 13, 1995, at B5 (describing Ejlat Feuer, a father who was
taken away from his family after he took nude pictures of his daughter for a photography
class at the respected International Center of Photography in Manhattan).
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pictures of children in the possession of a pedophile, and a
"pedophile" means someone who possesses child pornography.
In fact, if the subjective viewpoint of the pedophile can turn any
depictions of children into erotic pictures, then it really doesn't
matter whether we focus on the four corners of the photograph-its
"objective" contents-or the use of the photograph. In either case,
the overarching demand of child pornography law, that we evaluate
pictures from the perspective of a pedophile, wins out, by
transforming all representations of children into potential
pornography.
3. The Ramifications of the Expanded Definition of "Child
Pornography" for Valuable Speech
Perhaps the problems in child pornography law documented
above are worth it. After all, the crime of child sexual abuse is so
terrible that perhaps we should tolerate a higher degree of First
Amendment uncertainty in this area than in others. Who could
disagree with the spokesman for a national child abuse prevention
agency, who said, "'If people are erring on the side of protecting the
children from harm, I think that's a good trend"'?'7 3
Not only is there a significant harm to be averted, but we may also
assume that the amount of valuable speech threatened by child
pornography law is miniscule. What good use could there conceivably
be for pictures of children that are suspicious enough to be at risk
under child pornography laws?
In my judgment, the threat to protected and valuable speech is
much greater than the Supreme Court has acknowledged in its case
law. '7 I do not mean to argue that this diminishes the importance of
preventing the harm to children caused by the production of child
pornography. As I have shown above, however, child pornography law
has become less and less focused on reducing that harm; instead, it
has increasingly come to target pictures that were not the product of
1 Peggy O'Crowley, Suspicious Minds: Even Innocent Contact with Children Can Be
Misinterpreted, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 2, 2000, at I (quoting Kevin
Kirkpatrick, a spokesman for Prevent Child Abuse America, the largest national child
abuse prevention group in the country).
17 Professor Fallon wrote: "Whether the Court would hold works of
acknowledged social value to be constitutionally unprotected, so long as they satisfied
the judicially approved definition of 'child pornography,' is a question of general as
well as specific interest." Fallon, supra note 18, at 858 n.28.
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child abuse. Not only do these expansive laws, therefore, have less to
do with protecting children from molestation suffered in the
production of child pornography, but these laws also threaten a
significant amount of protected speech.
So far, the Supreme Court has rejected all "overbreadth"
challenges to child pornography laws. 175 The First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine allows a defendant to whom a statute may be
constitutionally applied to challenge the statute on the ground that it
may be unconstitutionally applied to others. 176 The primary purpose of
the doctrine is to combat a chilling effect on protected expression.77
Since a judgment of overbreadth may result in facial invalidation of a
statute, however, the doctrine is viewed as "strong medicine" that is
employed "sparingly, and only as a last resort.",7  The question
becomes whether the law is substantially overbroad: Does it threaten just
a few protected speakers, or does it threaten so many that it must be
invalidated to prevent a widespread chilling effect?
For example, in Ferber, the films at issue were "devoted almost
exclusively to depicting young boys masturbating.""7 " The Court found
that these films fell easily within the New York statute and merited no
175 The Court has also rejected challenges on vagueness grounds. Essentially,
vagueness challenges stem from two sources: the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause and the First Amendment. The Fifth Amendment vagueness doctrine prohibits
the enforcement of criminal prohibitions when they are so unclear that people of ordinary
intelligence would be unable to predict whether their conduct was forbidden. See, e.g.,
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (holding that a California loitering statute
was unconstitutionally vague). The First Amendment vagueness doctrine supplements
the doctrine rooted in the Fifth Amendment. As with overbreadth doctrine, the First
Amendment vagueness principle allows courts to facially invalidate statutes in order to
avoid chilling protected speech or to reduce "selective enforcement against unpopular"
speech. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435 (1963). Professor Fallon argues that First
Amendment vagueness doctrine "is best conceptualized as a subpart of First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine." Fallon, supra note 18, at 904. But see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERIcAN
CONSTITrrIONAL LAW § 12-29, at 1030 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that ajudicial construction
of a statute that eliminates overbreadth may still leave the statute impermissibly vague).
For purposes of this discussion, I will focus on overbreadth, and will not offer a separate
vagueness analysis.
Oakes, 491 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion). In this sense, the doctrine may be
viewed as an exception to general rules prohibiting third-party standing.
177 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). But see Henry Paul
Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (arguing that the core of First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine lies not in preventing a chilling effect on third
parties, but rather in the right of litigants "to be judged in accordance with a
constitutionally valid rule of law").
178 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
17" 458 U.S. at 752.
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constitutional protection. The Court acknowledged, however, that the
statute as written had the potential to chill speech that presumably""0
merited constitutional protection, such as "medical textbooks" with
depictions of nude children, or "pictorials in the Natianal Geographic.""5 '
Nonetheless, Justice White, writing the majority opinion for five of the
1812Justices, found that such overbreadth was not substantial . He
explained:
[N, e seriously doubt, and it has not been suggested, that these arguably
impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny
fraction of the materials within the statute's reach. Nor will we assume
that the New York courts will widen the possibly invalid reach of the
statute by giving an expansive construction to the proscription on "lewd
exhibition[s] of the genitals."... "[WV]hatever overbreadth may exist
should be cured through case-by-case analysis.
In the same way, the Court in Osbonne v. Ohio acknowledged that the
child pornography statute as upheld would apply to protected speech.
The Court wrote, "If, for example, a parent gave a family friend a
picture of the parent's infant taken while the infant was unclothed,
the statute would apply.".. But the Court still found that such
overbreadth problems were not substantial enough to invalidate the
statute.
Three assumptions have informed the Court's holdings that child
pornography laws were not overbroad. Recent developments call all
three of these assumptions into question.
First, the Ferber Court assumed that lower courts would not give an
"expansive construction to the proscription on 'lewd exhibition [s] of
the genitals.. ' ..' As the above discussion illustrated, however, lower
courts have continually expanded the construction of "lewd exhibition
of the genitals"-going so far as to include depictions of clothed
children in the category. Lower courts, therefore, have done precisely
1- I emphasize that the Court did not decide that such material would be
constitutionally protected. Instead, it offered those examples only to illustrate possible
overbreadth of the statute, calling the application of the statute to such speech only
"arguably impermissible." Id. at 773. The Court decided that, if necessary, any such
overbreadth could be "'cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations.'" Id.
at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
Id. at 773.
Id.
Id. at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
l Osborne, 495 U.S. at 113 n.9.
' 458 U.S. at 773-74 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
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the opposite of what the Supreme Court predicted they would do."''
Second, the Court assumed that there existed few family
photographs that might fall within the definition of child
pornography. As the Court stated in Ferber, any valuable works could
not amount to more than "a tiny fraction of the materials within the
statute's reach."9 7  This latter assumption depends on what one
scholar has called "uncabined judicial speculation in areas that are, at
best, on the outer fringes of the courts' practical competence."'" For
example, in Massachusetts v. Oakes, Justices Brennan and Scalia, in
separate opinions, reached different conclusions about the
substantiality of the overbreadth of a statute that would have
prohibited many depictions of simple child nudity. Both Justices
wrestled with the question of how many innocent family photographs
would be at risk-photographs, for example, of naked toddlers on the
beach or in the bathtub. Scalia estimated that few such pictures
exist.189  Brennan estimated that the number was significant.'"
Neither Justice had any empirical basis for his estimate. Their
judgments about the substantiality of the overbreadth were based on
nothing more than a hunch.
In the last decade, there have been numerous arrests of parents or
family members for pictures that they contend 9 ' were innocent family
snapshots.' 9' These arrests suggest anecdotally that the majority's
1W6 In addition, prosecutors have been extraordinarily aggressive in pursuing
suspected child pornography users. See, e.g., Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540
(1992) (overturning a child pornography conviction because of aggressive
prosecutorial entrapment).
187 458 U.S. at 773. The Court has adhered to the notion that the substantiality of
a statute's overbreadth should be "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
swee.'" Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
Fallon, supra note 18, at 894.
Oakes, 491 U.S. at 589 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 595 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Of course, I can offer no independent view as to the guilt or innocence of these
parties. Given that so much child sexual abuse occurs within the family, it seems
reasonable to believe that some family photographs are in fact indicative of sexual
abuse. It also seems evident, however, that some innocent parents have been
ensnared. See infra note 192 (listing some articles that decry arrests and argue that
"innocent" families have been accused).
192 See, e.g., Armond D. Budish, Law Disapproved of Mom's Photos of Girl, COLUMBUS
DIsPATcH, Apr. 21, 2000, at 2H ("Remember those cute baby pictures you took with
your child naked in the bathtub? You'd better burn them, or the pornography police
might get you."); Carvajal, supra note 172 (describing Ejlat Feuer, a father who was taken
away from his family after he took nude pictures of a his daughter for a photography class
at the respected International Center of Photography in Manhattan); The Edge with Paula
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hunch about the substantiality of overbreadth may have been wrong.
The numbers are significant enough that, in 1996, even a traditional
source such as Child magazine advised parents to be extremely
cautious when they take family photographs of their children for fear
of child pornography prosecution. Recent cases include a sixty-five-
year-old New Jersey grandmother and respected photographer who
was arrested in February 2000 for taking nude photographs of her
four-year-old granddaughter' 3 and an Ohio mother arrested in late
1999 for a snapshot of her eight-year-old daughter in the bathtub. 9
These arrests, as well as numerous other prosecutions against parents,9 5
suggest that the Court should revisit its earlier estimates about the
substantiality of overbreadth in the context of family photographs."9
The Court's third questionable assumption in its overbreadth
Zahn: Could Baby Pictures Be Considered Child Pornography? (Fox News broadcast, May 16,
2000) (discussing various cases of accusations against parents for nude pictures of their
children); Else Grech, Parents' Scrapbooks Full of Photos of Naked Children, TORONTO
STAR, Apr. 7, 2000, at LT1 (noting in a letter to the editor that most parents have
photographed their children nude); Mark Journey, Mother Charged with Possession of
Porn, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 9, 1988 (describing a mother charged with
possession of child pornography after she had photos of her nude seven-year-old
daughter developed at a local drugstore); O'Crowley, supra note 173 (describing the
danger to innocent family photographs); Photos Spark Investigation: Mother Took Nude
Pictus of Her Son for Photography Class, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 13, 1996, at 5A
(discussing the arrest of "a part-time student in a beginning photography class at
Harvard University" for what she claims were innocent pictures of her nude four-year-
old son); Sataline, supra note 62 (stating that child pornography laws have "ensnared
innocent parents and professional photographers"); Suitable for Framing? Lorain Mom's
Nude Picturis of Her 8-Year-Old Daughter Raise Questions About Parenting and Prosecution,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 16, 1999, at 8B [hereinafter Suitable for Framing?]
(describing a mother arrested for taking nude pictures of her daughter in a bathtub);
Kathy Swindle, Family Matters, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Sept. 9, 1996, at 5C (noting that
Child magazine reports that arrests of parents are "on the rise" because of broader
enforcement of child pornography laws and advising parents to be careful when taking
nude shots of children).
1 3 See Kate Coscarelli & Jeffery C. Mays, Photos of Undressed Kids Get Grandmother
Arrested, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Feb. 5,2000, at 1.
I I See Suitable for Framing?, supra note 192 (discussing this case and its relationship
to "family culture, a child's right to privacy and parental responsibility").
V6, Set supra note 192 (providing a few examples of the numerous reports
describing cases in which "innocent" families were accused of child pornography based
on family photographs).
V , Since overbreadth is such an inexact doctrine, it is unclear whether these new
cases, which are simply anecdotal evidence of overbreadth, would sway the Court. I
have no empirical basis on which to challenge the Court's assumption. This record of
prosecutions, however, does suggest that child pornography law has drifted in a
direction that threatens more speech than the Court initially estimated.
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rulings in child pornography cases was that these laws posed little
threat to artistic expression. In Ferber, the Court dismissed even the
possibility that childhood sexuality could be an "important and
necessary" subject for art.97 Justice White remarked that if there were
"any' "expressive interests"'98 at stake, they were "de minimis." l ' In his
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens added that "it is probably safe to
assume that the category of speech that is covered by the New York
statute generally is of a lower quality than most other types of
communication. "21 In Massachusetts v. Oakes, when Justice Brennan
argued in dissent that the law threatened the tradition of great
artists-from Donatello to Degas-who have portrayed child nudity, "'
the majority rejected his concerns.
Recent developments in art, as well as recent prosecutions, suggest
that the Court seriously underestimated the threat posed to artistic
expression. Over the last decade, just as the law has expanded, child
sexuality has emerged as a major subject in artistic culture.2 From
the best-selling high-art photographer Sally Mann, who takes nudes of
her prepubescent children in poses that many people consider
erotic,2 3 to the soaring craze for artist Henry Darger, the "'Poussin of
197 458 U.S. at 762-63.
198 Id. at 764 (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 762. Justice White also allowed that "if it were necessary for literary or artistic
value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger could be utilized." Id.
at 763 (citations omitted).
200 Id. at 781 (Stevens,J., concurring).
201 Oakes, 491 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his Osborne dissent, Justice
Brennan returned to this theme, writing that "Michelangelo's 'David' might be said to
have a 'graphic focus' on the genitals .... Similarly, a painting of a partially clad girl
could be said to involve a 'graphic focus'. . . as could the depictions of nude children
on the friezes that adorn our courtroom." Osborne, 495 U.S. at 137-38 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
202 See Adler, Perverse Law, supra note 17, at 50-51 (discussing this emergence and
questioning whether it has emerged, in part, because of child pornography laws).
Some of the prominent contemporary artists whose work depicts child nudity include
Jock Sturges, Larry Clark, Wendy Ewald, Collier Schorr, and Jake and Dinos Chapman.
The latter two were among the notorious "Sensation" artists. See generally Andrew Ross,
Sensation on Triak Andrew Ross Talks with Amy Adler, ARTFORUM, Nov. 1999, at 45
(discussing the heated controversy over the Brooklyn Museum of Art's "Sensation"
exhibition). For more on the work of Jake and Dinos Chapman, see Robert
Rosenblum, Dinos &Jake Chapnan, ARTFORLM, Sept. 1996, at 101.
203 For descriptions of Mann's work and representative photographs, see Anastasia
Aukeman, Sally Mann at Houk Friedman, ART IN AMERIcA, Feb. 1993, at 113, Richard B.
Woodward, The Disturbing Photography of Sally Mann, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, § 6
(Magazine), at 29, and Amy Adler, Photography on Trial, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Mar. 1996,
at 141.
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pedophilia,' ' 414 child sexuality has become central to contemporary
art.
The threat to artistic expression is more urgent because of
another facet of child pornography law: the Court's refusal to make
an exception in the definition of "child pornography" for works of
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 05 It has long
been a principle of adult obscenity law that no matter how shocking or
how offensive a sexually explicit work might otherwise be, it should be
protected speech if it demonstrates serious artistic value.20' Although
the defense of serious value has not yet been raised before the Court
in a child pornography case, the Court has noted in dicta that the
whole notion of whether a work is art-a central consideration when
dealing with adult obscenity-is extraneous to the problem of child
pornography. The Ferber Court observed: "It is irrelevant to the child
[who has been abused] whether or not the material ... has... artistic
value." 4'7 Justice White remarked that a work which has serious value
"may nevertheless embody the hardest core of child pornography.""' , In
a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor argued the point further. She
wrote: "The audience's appreciation of the depiction is simply irrelevant
to [the] interest in protecting children ... 
Coupled with the expanding definition of child pornography as
chronicled above, this rejection of an exception for works of serious
value means that many contemporary artworks have no protection
under the First Amendment. Consider, for example, photographer
Sally Mann's nudes of her children.2'" Although Mann has so far
escaped prosecution, her work would appear to fit squarely within the
definition of child pornography as courts have developed it. For
example, a photograph of Mann's daughter entitled Venus After School
pictures the naked child languorously spread on a divan in the precise
position of Manet's famous portrait of a prostitute. In Mann's portrait
!:1 Sarah Boxer, He Was Crazy Like A... Genius?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2000, at B7
(quoting Time magazine art critic Robert Hughes on the work of artist Henry Darger).
Boxer's article explains that Darger's "status [has] really soared" in the last few years.
Id.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20-23 (1973). For criticism of this standard,
see Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note 71.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (citation omitted).
SId.
Id. at 775 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
• See supra note 203.
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of her son Jesse, entitled Popsicle Drips, the artist focuses on the young
211boy's naked torso. The boy's genitals are the centerpiece of the
picture, which is cropped at the knees and at the shoulders. Certainly
these works seem to fit easily within recent, expansive interpretations by
courts of the definition of "child pornography."
Though these photographs may be disturbing, they are also rich
with artistic resonance. Popsicle Drips alludes to a famous work by
acclaimed photographer Edward Weston of his son Neil's nude body.
Both Mann's and Weston's pictures recall classical sculptures of
kouroi, youthful naked figures.1 2 Even Mann's photograph, Venus
After School, with its provocative title, has rich artistic allusions. The
photograph's composition makes direct reference to the Manet
portrait, as well as to Titian's great masterpiece, the Venus of Urbino. If
Mann or other artists like her were prosecuted for child pornography
violations, it seems that there would be no protection for such work
under existing child pornography law. Only an exception for value
could save them, an exception the Court has so far refused to draw.13
Other artists have already been arrested. For instance, art
photographer Alice Sims was arrested and her two small children were
seized when a lab developed some of her pictures. 21 4 Recent child
pornography prosecutions against mainstream targets suggest just how
far the law has drifted: both Alabama and Tennessee prosecuted the
bookstore chain Barnes & Noble for selling photography books by
artistsJock Sturges, whose work hangs in the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, and David HIamilton. 2'5 The FBI raided and ransacked Sturges's
21 The title of the photograph refers to what appear to be drip-like stains, as if from a
popsicle, on the boy's body.
212 Such classical sculptures have been interpreted as sexual. For descriptions of
kouroi, see GISELA MA. RICHTER, KOUROI: ARCHAIC GREEKYOUTHS (1960).
213 The Dost factors may offer another chance for acquittal. As explained above,
the sixth Dost factor is often interpreted to mean that the photographer who takes the
picture must have lascivious intent. It seems that Mann's intent is artistic, not
lascivious. But of course, this begs the question. As I have detailed above, the pressure
of child pornography law undermines any inquiry into intent by focusing instead on
the deviant response of a pedophile viewer. See supra notes 140-67 and accompanying
text (analyzing the law's focus on the pedophile's response).
214 See supra notes 172, 192 (describing arrests of art students such as Ejlat Feuer,
who took nude pictures of his daughter, and a Harvard student who took nude
pictures of her son); see also, e.g., Stephan Salisbury, Big Brother Finds a Niche in the Photo
Developing Business, RECORD (Bergen, N.J.),Jan. 25, 1991, at A24 (describing the 1988
arrest of artist Alice Sims and the seizure of her two small children based on her
photographs of them).
21 See Keith Russell, Anti-Porn Group Wages Moral Battle, NASHVILLE BANNER, Dec.
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studio in 1993, but a grand jury refused to indict him for child
216pornography violations. In 1997, Oklahoma brought child
pornography charges against a video store that rented the Academy
Award-winning film, The Tin Drum, based on a novel by Gunter
Grass. 7  Hollywood studios reportedly shunned the remake of the
film Lolita based on fears of criminal prosecution; despite the
filmmakers' careful use of body doubles for all controversial scenes, it
took a year, as well as significant cutting, to find a studio willing to
release the film.
21
Perhaps there should be no exception for value in child
pornography law. Perhaps harm to child participants should render
any resulting artistic value irrelevant to legal analysis. But to
understand the true costs of the decision not to except works of value,
we must assess this stance in light of the evolving definition of "child
pornography" and the growing artistic interest in depicting children's
bodies. Taken together, these developments mean that even case-by-
case analysis, a method the Court thought certain to cure "whatever
overbreadth may exist," will not protect valuable artistic speech that
depicts child nudity."' A far more significant amount of artistic
speech than the Court has acknowledged is vulnerable under child
pornography law.
29, 1997, at Al. I use the word "mainstream" to refer to Barnes & Noble, not to the
artists themselves.
"" Philip Hager, U.S. GrandJuy Refuses to Indict Photographer, LA. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1991,atA3.
!17 See Lois Romano, Seizure of 1979 Art Film Draws Fire, WASH. POST, June 30, 1997,
at Al (describing the series of events that led to the seizure of The Tin Drum by
Oklahoma City police). A federal judge ruled that the film did not violate Oklahoma's
statute. State v. Blockbuster Videos, Inc., 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1248 (W.D. Okla.
1998), availabk at 1998 WL 1108158; Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. City of Oklahoma
City, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (W.D. Okla. 1997) (ordering the confiscated videotapes
returned).
• See Celestine Bohlen, A New 'Lolita' Stalls in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1997,
at El (reporting the unsuccessful attempts of the producers of Lolita to secure a
distribution agreement in the United States); John Dempsey & Christian Moerk, It's
Pay Before Play, DAILY VARIETW, Nov. 8, 1999, at 5 (describing the eventual distribution
of the remake of Lolita on cable television and in theaters).
21 NewYorkv. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,773 (1982) (citations omitted).
The lack of exception for value has ramifications for other speech, not just art.
For example, consider the recent arrest and guilty plea of a reporter who had received
child pornography, but claimed that he had done so in order to pursue an
underground investigation for an article. He moved to dismiss, raising a free speech
claim, but the court rejected the motion. It held that even well-intended uses of
images of child pornography are unprotected. United States v. Matthews, 209 F.3d 338
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III. THE RADICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
LAW FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In this part of the Article, I show that child pornography law poses
a different and more far-reaching set of problems than the ones
described above. The law has radical implications for all of free
speech. Child pornography law has validated a renegade vision of
how speech works. It is a vision that we have rejected in every other
First Amendment context. Child pornography law has collapsed the
"speech/action" distinction that occupies a central role in First
Amendment law.221
The speech/action distinction has been the subject of repeated
attacks by critics of traditional free speech jurisprudence.2 22 The most
prominent leaders of these attacks have been "leftist" censor-
ship advocates:211" antipornography feminists, led by CatharineM ... 224
MacKinnon, and anti-hate-speech scholars.2 "5 Both of these groups
of leftist censors wish to prohibit speech that harms historically
victimized classes of society. To do so, they are waging nothing less
(4th Cir. 2000).
22 Although the role of this distinction is central, it is also contested. As I show
below, it has produced a chaotic and unruly doctrine.
= See generally FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH ACTS" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993) (describing frequent attempts to ban speech by refraining it as action).
23 Adler, What's Left? supra note 20, at 1500. Although I think the "left" is, in fact,
deeply divided, I nonetheless use the word "left" to refer to social movements that seek
equality or empowerment for marginalized or oppressed groups, such as women,
people of color, gays, and lesbians. See Ellen Willis, Porn Free: MacKinnon's Neo-Statism
and the Politics of Speech, TRANSITION, Issue 63, 1994, at 4, 7.
224 For examples of MacKinnon's work, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DIScOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS (1993) [hereinafter
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS]; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY] (1989). MacKinnon has
worked extensively with writer Andrea Dworkin, with whom she has co-authored
antipornography legislation. See ANDREA DwORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
PORNOGRAPHYAND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALI'Y (1988), for the
text of the legislation and commentary. For examples of Dworkin's independent work
presenting the feminist ideas and goals underyling proposed antipornography laws,
see ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood:
Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985).
225 For examples of some of the scholarship advocating regulation of "hate
speech," see Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); Marl J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323
n.15 (1989); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129 (1987).
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than a war on traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. They
argue that certain forms of "hate speech" and "pornography,""( which
currently receive First Amendment protection, are more akin to
action than to speech and should no longer merit constitutional
refuge. Courts, of course, have rejected these new theories (to the
extent they have encountered them) .22 After all, the theories attack
an elemental principle of free speech law-the division between
speech and action. They are unapologetically unconstitutional under
our current understanding of the First Amendment.
2 s
"" Obscenity," unlike "pornography," is a term of art in First Amendment law.
"Pornography," as used by antipornography critics, refers to a vast range of sexually
explicit material, much of which is protected under current First Amendment law.
One example would be so called "soft core" pornography, such as the nude pictures
displayed in Playboy magazine. MacKinnon argues that although these pictures are
protected by obscenity law, they should be prohibited as "pornography" that harms
women. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNIODIFIED, supra
note 224, at 146, 154 [hereinafter MACKINNON, Not a MoralIssue].
"J See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (invalidating
an ordinance that enacted Catharine MacKinnon's antipornography theory into law),
affd mee., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
The anti-hate-speech theories have not received the same direct attention from
courts as have the antipornography theories. Of course, implicit in the Court's
opinion in RA. V v. City of St. Paul for example, is the view that cross burning is speech
not action, as some anti-hate-speech theorists would argue. 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)
(finding unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited some "fighting words" but not
others). In contrast, Justice Stevens's opinion in RA. V. illustrates the temptation to
view the cross burning primarily as conduct, albeit expressive conduct, and to de-
emphasize its message or ideas. He writes, "The cross burning in this case-directed as
it was to a single African-American family trapped in their home-was nothing more
than a crude form of physical intimidation. That this cross burning sends a message of
racial hostility does not automatically endow it with complete constitutional
protection." Id. at 432 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Stevens still views the cross
burning as expressive, he emphasizes its action component-it is a form of "physical
intimidation"--and therefore views it as less protected. Id.
The idea that racist hate speech is usually protected is at the core of Brandenburg,
where the Court protected the hateful messages spoken at a Ku Klux Klan rally
because the speech did not amount to "incitement to imminent lawless action."
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). For another classic example of the
tolerance accorded to hate speech under the First Amendment, see Colin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), which found that certain ordinances of Skokie, Illinois,
drafted to prevent a Nazi demonstration, violated the First Amendment.
"" See Adler, Wat's Left?, supra note 20, at 1501 (noting that leftist censors
"deliberately disregard" notions that "have been the foundation of First Amendment
law); see also, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 224, at 156
(criticizing the notion that under current "First Amendment logic.., words or
pictures can be harmful only if they produce harm in a form that is considered an
action").
Of course, there are numerous reasons that the leftist censorship proposals do not
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Although these theories have been resolutely rejected, an odd
thing has happened. The principle that underlies these theories, the
idea that certain speech is better seen as action, has surreptitiously
found refuge in another place in the First Amendment: the law of
child pornography. In child pornography cases, courts begin to
sound a lot like the "radical" First Amendment critics. We have
accepted a theory of speech, quite similar to the one proffered by
leftist scholars, that has been rejected in every other context.2  In
fact, child pornography law has enshrined a vision of how speech
works that is fundamentally incompatible with the way we think about
speech in all other areas of First Amendment law.
In the following sections, I begin with a brief account of the
traditional First Amendment speech/action dichotomy. I also set
forth the two-pronged attack, waged by antipornography feminists and
anti-hate-speech scholars, on the speech/action division. I then trace
the two-step process by which child pornography law has followed this
course. Although my argument is that child pornography law has
validated a view of speech proffered by both feminist antipornography
advocates and anti-hate-speech advocates, for the sake of brevity, I will
focus primarily on the feminist campaign, which is similar in logic to
the anti-hate-speech campaign.2so
A. Speech vs. Action
1. Doctrinal Roots
It is such a basic assumption in free speech law that it hardly needs
repeating: speech is different from all other forms of action.nI Under
the Constitution, speech is protected from government incursions in a
conform with constitutional norms. The rejection of the speech/action division is just
one of a larger set of constitutional problems. See Adler, What's Left?, supra note 20, at
1508-16 (analyzing the feminist antipornography and anti-hate-speech theories).
229 Thus, child pornography law may be another place that unites -leftist" and
conservative activists. I have previously noted the strange political convergence on the
subject of adult pornography. See Adler, What's Left?, supra note 20, at 1500 (describing
the "symmetry" between left and right censorship movements).2380 For an extended comparison of the two schools, see Adler, What's Left?, supra
note 20.
231 Throughout this Article, I use the words "action" and "conduct"
interchangeably. To describe the distinction as "speech vs. action" or "speech vs.
conduct" is imperfect, since speech and action so often coincide.
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way that other conduct is not.212 As Thomas Emerson wrote, "[t]he
central idea of a system of freedom of expression is that a fundamental
distinction must be drawn between conduct which consists of
'expression' and conduct which consists of 'action.' 23 3 Of course,
distinguishing between speech and action is a complex task. One
familiar problem, for example, is that speech-at least verbal
utterance-is itself a form of action. In the same way, some action-
even wordless action-can be expressive and therefore categorized as
"speech." Although several scholars have contested the usefulness, as
well as the accuracy, of this distinction as a tool for explaining the
First Amendment, '  the problem of dividing speech from action
consumes a significant part of case law and scholarship.2 3
Free speech scholars often mean different things when they talk
about the division between speech and action. To convey properly
iZ This distinction is fundamental not only to the First Amendment, but also to
culture more broadly. For example, one scholar writes that the decision to limit
behavior but not speech "furnishes the essential dynamic of Western culture." ROGER
SHAITUCiK, FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE: FROM PROMETHEUS TO PORNOGRAPHY 5 (1996).1 i THOUMLS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 17 (1970)
(emphasis added); see also Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a
Good Thing Too, BOSTON REv., Feb. 1992, at 23. Fish writes, "If the First Amendment is
to make any sense, have any bite, speech must be declared not to be a species of
action, or to be a special form of action lacking the aspects of action that cause it to be
the object of regulation." Id. Fish then criticizes the distinction between speech and
action, and thereby argues that the First Amendment does not "make any sense." Id.
:- See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 175, § 12-7, at 827 ("All communication except
perhaps that of the extrasensory variety involves conduct.").
See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, supra note 7, at 9-45 (criticizing the distinction between
communicative content and noncommunicative conduct as an organizing principle of
First Amendment law); see alsoJohn Hart Ely, FlagDesecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1490-96
(1975) (objecting to a speech/conduct distinction); Robert Post, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. RE,. 1249, 1250-60, 1273-77 (1995) (noting the crude
and undeveloped state of analysis for dividing speech and action).
See, r.g., EMERSON, supra note 233, at 9-17 (arguing that the expression/action
distinction is key to understanding the First Amendment); KENT" GREENAWALT,
SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 228-32 (1989) (claiming that the division
betueen speech and action is central but not "the central key to First Amendment
adjudication" (emphasis added)); Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech
IIndor the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 30-38 (1973) (establishing the centrality
of a content/conduct distinction); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564-66
(1965) (distinguishing between "speech in its pristine form" and "expression mixed
x'ith particular conduct"). Commenting on Cox v. Louisiana, Harry Kalven described
the weaknesses of any distinction between "speech pure" and "speech plus." Harry
Kalven,Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 22-
23.
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the radical nature of child pornography law, I will examine the broad
and varying roles that the speech/action distinction plays in First
Amendment law. My goal here is to elucidate the complex functions
this distinction serves in the jurisprudence. Given the confused, even
chaotic, nature of the doctrine on speech/action, my aim is not to
rally support for this dichotomy as a method for thinking about the
First Amendment. 237 Rather, it is to describe the extent to which the
speech/action dichotomy is embedded in First Amendment thinking
and to set the stage for understanding how the law of child
pornography has undermined this foundation.
There are four significant ways in which this division figures in the
law of free speech. First, and most fundamentally, the division
between speech and all other forms of action provides a basis for
understanding why speech is given constitutional protection. Much
scholarship explores the distinctions between speech and action as a
means to justify speech's special status under the First Amendment
and the Court's Talmudic efforts to divide speech from all other
behavior.2
Second, in keeping with these justifications, the speech/action
distinction can signal an initial inquiry into whether the material in
question is really "speech" at all, that is, whether it even invokes the
protection of the First Amendment.' 39 This inquiry sometimes arises
237 The distinction has produced a chaotic body of case law, and is imperfect
because the line between speech and action is permeable. Nevertheless, the
speech/action distinction still occupies a central role in First Amendment thought.
23 Why do we give this special protection to speech and not other forms of
conduct? There are two broad ways to begin to answer this question. One response is
that speech often has special value compared to other forms of behavior. See
EMERSON, supra note 233, at 8-9 (stating that expression is more valuable and less
harmful than action); David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral
Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1974) (reasoning that the special
value of speech links it to thought, reason, and wonder, and places it above all other
forms of fulfillment). A second approach evaluates the harm of speech, and concludes
either that speech causes harm in a different manner than other conduct does or that
speech causes a different and lesser kind of harm than other conduct does. These two
views about value and harm can be combined or not: many scholars choose one or the
other view as sufficient to justify special protection for speech. See C. EDWIN BAKER,
HUMAN LImERT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 70-73 (1989) (rejecting to some extent the
speech/action dichotomy, yet noting that speech causes harm in a different manner
than other behavior does); Frederick Schauer, The Phenomenologj of Speech and Harm,
103 ETHics 635, 638 (1993). Subscription to both views-that speech has special value
and that it causes lesser harm-allows the greatest rationale for free speech support.
Emerson's theory of free speech, for example, adheres to both views.
29 This question also arose in the Court's first obscenity decision, Roth v. United
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in the symbolic speech or "expressive conduct" cases. Although I
leave that problem aside in this Article, the paradigmatic case involves
conduct that is "expressive" despite the absence of words or pictures
and therefore is subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
40
Third, the speech/action division may refer to cases where speech
is so incendiary and its connection to violent action so immediate that
it can no longer be separated from its violent results. Of course, we
recognize that speech frequently leads to action because it influences
behavior." But the normal rule in such cases is that only the action,
not the speech, may be prohibited. 42  In fact, to the extent that
speech causes unpleasant effects, this is why we protect speech, not
why we ban it;1 -4 such effects are a testament to the power of speech.
Yet, sometimes, speech may erupt into illegal conduct in a way so
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), where it reasoned that "obscenity" was a category so
utterly worthless in terms of its First Amendment value that it was "not speech" and
uithout constitutional protection.
!p For a statement of the test that applies to expressive conduct or symbolic
speech cases involving conduct that combines "'speech' and 'non-speech' elements,"
see UnitedStates v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
Obscenity law, as interpreted by some scholars, was for a time explained in terms
of the speech/action division. Most prominently, John Finnis and Frederick Schauer
argued that because obscene material appeals to the body, obscenity is physical rather
than mental and thus does not invoke the coverage of the First Amendment. See
SCI-LVTER, supra note 155, at 182 (describing pornography "as a physical rather than a
mental experience");John M. Finnis, "Reason and Passion". The Constitutional Dialectic of
Fi', Spe,'ch and Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 227-28 (1967) (arguing that obscenity
pertains to the realm of passions and not to the realm of ideas). This reasoning does
not conflict with the theory underlying Roth v. United States: that obscenity does not
participate in the marketplace of ideas and therefore is not "speech" for purposes of
First Amendment analysis. Roth, however, emphasized that obscenity wvas valueless and
did not express ideas; the opinion did not mention obscenity's physical appeal. 354
U.S. at 485. In any event, this reasoning did not persist in the Court's later obscenity
cases. Miller v. California ushered in an era of balancing. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The
Court introduced the idea that some material that clearly is "speech" may not be
sufficiently valuable to merit protection if it demonstrates prurient appeal and patent
offensiveness. Id. at 24.
;A See, e.g., Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985)
("People often act in accordance with the images and patterns they find around
them.").
ZU Set, id. at 333 ("Much speech is dangerous.... [Ideas] leave loss in their
wake.").
i1 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) ("'[T he fact that
society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed,
if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for
according it constitutional protection.'" (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
745 (1978)) (alteration in original)); see also Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327-30.
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immediate that the two merge to become one and the same. This is
the problem that gripped the Court for many years in the subversive
advocacy cases and that led to the Brandenburg "incitement to
imminent lawless action" test.244 As Justice Douglas so colorfully
described this phenomenon, it is at the moment when speech
becomes "brigaded with action" that it loses its protection.4 ' But
unless the connection between speech and lawless action is
246intentional and immediate, only the action, not the speech, may be
criminalized.247
Fourth, there are other, less dramatic, occasions when the
speech/action division comes into play and allows for the possible
regulation of expression. Often, the speech/action division stands as
a proxy for an inquiry into whether a law is "content-based" or
"content-neutral." In this familiar First Amendment exercise, a court
must decide whether the regulation at issue goes to the expressive
nature of the speech or to some "non-meaning" effect that may be
248permissibly governed. Several related problems arise in this context
24 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("Constitutional guarantees of
free speech. .. do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe the use of force ... except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action."); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining "'fighting' words" as "those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" and
finding them outside the scope of First Amendment protection). Chaplinsky's sweep
was limited by Cohen v. California, the notorious "Fuck the Draft" case, in which the
Court protected Cohen's right to wear ajacket bearing the offending words in public.
403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971). Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, distinguished
Chaplinsky by reasoning that Cohen's message, albeit "provocative," was "not 'directed
to the person of the hearer.'" Id. at 20 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
309 (1940)); see also Street v. NewYork, 394 U.S. 576,592 (1969) (limiting the scope of
Chaplinsky by referring to a "small class of 'fighting words'"). For a discussion of the
doctrine of "hostile audiences," see Feinerv. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951).
24 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 536-37 (1958) (Douglas,J, concurring).
246 Hess v. Indiana made clear that the Court interprets immediacy quite strictly.
The Court held unconstitutional under Brandenburg a conviction against a defendant
who said, at an anti-war rally, "We'll take the fucking street later." 414 U.S. 105, 107
(1973) (emphasis added).
2 Justice Douglas put it bluntly in his Brandenburg concurrence: "The line
between what is permissible and not subject to control and what may be made
impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas and overt acts."
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456 (Douglas, J., concurring). Still, I would emphasize that
this line that Justice Douglas refers to is extremely difficult to draw and that even his
own concurring opinion in Brandenburg evidences that difficulty.
248 See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3.02[1l [a] (1994) (noting that the initial
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and have given birth to various doctrines. For example, under the
O'Bfien doctrine, '49 someone who engages in expressive conduct, such
as the defendant in that case who burned a draft card in protest of the
Nrietnam war, might still find that his expression is squelched in spite
of its status as communicative, which makes it subject to First
Amendment scrutiny. If the government regulation of conduct is
unrelated to the content of the speech, but incidentally restricts it, the
regulation may still be permissible.' 0 A related problem concerns the
application of the "secondary effects" doctrine, which permits the
regulation of speech based on certain "secondary effects," but only
when such effects are not related to the meaning or "'the content of
the... speech. ' ' The paradigmatic case is City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., which allowed the zoning of "adult" theatres because
they were associated with increased prostitution in the areas where
they were clustered. 2 Another variation of the problem of sorting
question whether law is aimed at conduct or speech, or more precisely at content or
noncommunicative aspects of expression, often determines the result of a case). Thus,
with expressive conduct cases, the determination that conduct is subject to First
Amendment scrutiny is only the first step. Under United States v. O'Brien, the conduct
may still be regulated. See infra note 249.
O'Brien requires that a regulation must further an important or substantial
government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression, and that the burden
on speech must be no greater than necessary to further the interest. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797-
98 (1989) (expressing the functional equivalence of the test applied to time, place,
and manner regulations and the O'Brien standard for regulation of symbolic speech);
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984) ("[R]easonable
time, place or manner restrictions on expression are constitutionally acceptable.").
Such was the holding in O'Brien. 391 U.S. at 372. In yet another context,
courts must sometimes parse out the communicative from the "noncommunicative"
aspects of speech; "noncommunicative" aspects such as excessive noise may be
regulated as conduct. This distinction was first made in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
89 (1949), where the Court upheld a prohibition against the use of loudspeakers in
residential areas. See generally TRIBE, supra note 175, § 12-2, at 789-94.
In my opinion, this project of separating out the communicative and
noncommunicative aspects of speech is fundamentally flawed because it ignores the
mnultivalent quality of expression-the ways in which qualities such as sound and tone,
etc., change the meaning of words. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)
(noting the "dual communicative function of speech").
Z-1 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va.
Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
475 U.S. at 54. Renton considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance
restricting the location of adult bookstores and movie theaters. Other Supreme Court
cases that discuss secondary effects include: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 286
(2000) (upholding a ban on nude dancing based on its nonmeaning "secondary
effects"), R no v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (finding a statute regulating indecent
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out speech and action can occur when speech accompanies conduct
that is subject to regulation. For example, if someone speaks while
engaging in an illegal act, the speech itself might be25' separate and
therefore protected from prosecution even if the act were not.
2
5
2. The Attack on the Speech/Action Dichotomy
In recent years, a pressing new challenge to the speech/action
dichotomy has arisen. Feminist antipornography theorists and anti-
hate-speech theorists argue that "pornography" and "hate speech" are
not speech, but action itself, and should no longer be protected by the
First Amendment. Essentially, these critics claim that the harm
pornography and hate speech cause is so dramatic and far-reaching
speech on the internet to be directed at the "primary" effect of indecent speech),
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 582 (1991) (SouterJ., concurring) (arguing
that a statute prohibiting public nudity can be constitutionally employed to prohibit
nude dancing at a sexually oriented business because of secondary effects associated
with such establishments), and Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 708 (1986)
(O'Connor,J., concurring) (discussing "perceived secondary effects").
253 I say "might be" protected because of the complex ways in which courts avoid
framing certain crimes as even raising a free speech issue. Consider, for example, the
crime of solicitation: speech is central to it, yet outlawing solicitation is not thought to
raise First Amendment problems. See GREENAWALT, supra note 236, at 82-84.
C4 Giboney, mentioned in passing in Ferber, would suggest the contrary. See
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). As Justice Douglas
explained in another case, the Giboney Court held that speech "was enjoined because it
was an inseparable part of conduct which the state constitutionally could and did
regulate." Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc. 354 U.S. 284, 296 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Giboney, 336 U.S. at 503). Schauer argued that this
aspect of Giboney has been implicitly discredited in light of more recent free speech
decisions, most notably the Pentagon Papers case. See Schauer, supra note 15, at 300
(arguing that both New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam), and Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), establish
that communication that arises from an illegal act or is part of a course of illegal action
cannot itself be criminalized); see also Sandra Zunker Brown, Supreme Court Review: First
Amendment Nonobscene Child Pornography and Its Categorical Exclusion from Constitutional
Protection, 73J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1337, 1348 n.83 (1982) (reviewing the then-
recent Supreme Court decision in Ferber, and stating that "Giboney is not only
inapplicable to the facts of Ferber but is also of doubtful continuing validity"). But see
infra note 277 (citing cases that leave open the possibility of criminalizing publication
of speech arising from illegal acts). To the extent that Giboney stands for another
proposition, mainly that a crime is still a crime even if it is "carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed," that point is undoubtedly true. Giboney,
336 U.S. at 502. One need only look at securities laws or numerous other laws, all of
which regulate criminal activity that is conducted through speech yet none of which
present First Amendment problems. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 457-59 (1978) (permitting states to regulate attorneys' solicitation of clients).
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that it surpasses the harm of "only words," and that it is equivalent to
violent conduct.255
Catharine MacKinnon, the leading antipornography feminist,
wages a two-pronged assault on the speech/action dichotomy.
25
1
Pornographic images are doubly harmful from her perspective. First,
she argues that they are inseparable from the violent action that
produced them: they document "traffic in female sexual slavery."
2'7
MacKinnon offers vivid details of how the production of pornography
harms the women who pose for it. She argues that the pornography
industry "forces, threatens, blackmails, pressures, tricks, and cajoles
women into sex for pictures."25 She emphasizes violent acts of abuse:
"[WIomen are gang raped so they can be filmed.... [W]omen are
hurt and penetrated, tied and gagged... so sex pictures can be
made."Z" MacKinnon dismisses the argument that many women
voluntarily pose for pornography. She contends that when women
"consent" to pose for pornography, such consent is tainted because
"all pornography is made under conditions of inequality based on sex,
overwhelmingly by poor, desperate, homeless, pimped women who
were sexually abused as children."'O
Second, she argues that pornography causes a social construction
harm. According to MacKinnon, pornography constructs a world in
which all women are victimized. Pornographic images, already the
product of violence, harm women beyond those in the pictures:
" 1
they "institutionaliz[e] a subhuman, victimized, second-class status for
women by conditioning orgasm to sex inequality."'2 She writes:
2.' Judith Butler argues that this attempt to reframe speech as conduct is at work
in several contemporary political spheres, not only in the hate speech and
pornography debates. JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE
PERrORUTIVE 74-75 (1997).
,"" See MA,\cKINNON, ONLY vORDS, supra note 224, at 10-14 (outlining the theory
that pornography is more akin to action than to speech.)
DWORKIN & MIAcKINNON, supra note 224, at 46. MacKinnon views all such
women as victims of coercion. Even if they assert that they pose willingly, MacKinnon
believes their consent to pose is invalid because their choice is predetermined by the
sexist, pornographic society in which we live. Given this lack of consent, MacKinnon
therefore calls pornography a documentation of rape.
1 MAcKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 224, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 20.
See id. at 25 ("Pornography brings its conditions of production to the
consumer. sexual dominance.").
DwoRKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 224, at 46. MacKinnon has witten that
"pornography, ith the rape and prostitution in which it participates, institutionalizes
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"Social inequality is substantially created and enforced-that is, dolle-
through words and images."2 63 Arguing that pornography is therefore
action, not just speech, she writes that pornography "is a form of
forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an institution of gender
inequality., 26 4 Thus MacKinnon concludes that pornography is more
"actlike than thoughtlike '2 65 and that it should no longer merit First
266Amendment protection.
Critics debate whether these theories are valuable from a
normative or descriptive perspective. What is certain is that they are
unconstitutional under our current understanding of the First
Amendment. In fact, that is MacKinnon's point. She attacks central
First Amendment tenets, deriding traditional notions of value and
spurning accepted notions of harm. Thus, when Indianapolis
adopted an antipornography ordinance based on MacKinnon's work,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals easily struck it down as
unconstitutional. 2r 7  The Court acknowledged for the sake of
argument the harms pornography were said to cause, but refused to
classify pornography as action rather than speech. According to the
court, these harms occurred by way of "mental intermediation," thus
keeping them back from the realm of action and firmly planted in the
realm of expression.266
But is MacKinnon's theory really so outlandish? If we switch the
frame and consider the law of child pornography, the answer might
surprise us. It is here that the Supreme Court begins to sound a lot
like the "radical" critics of hate speech and adult pornography. In
child pornography law, the Court has tacitly accepted the merger of
the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the eroticization of dominance and
submission with the social construction of male and female." MACKINNON, FEMINIST
THEORY, supra note 224, at 197.
263 MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 224, at 13.
264 MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 224, at 197 (footnote omitted).
265 Id. at 204.
266 The attempt to recharacterize speech as action follows this same pattern in the
attack on "hate speech." Marl Matsuda, a leading anti-hate-speech scholar, likens hate
speech to violent action, writing that "[riacist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets,
and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group." Matsuda, supra note
225, at 2332 (emphasis added). Furthermore, hate speech causes a social construction
harm: it is a "mechanism of subordination" which reinforces a historically vertical
relationship. Id. at 2358.
267 Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affJd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
268 Id. at 329.
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speech and conduct on which feminists and anti-hate-speech scholars
insist.
B. Conflating Image and Act in Child Pornography Law
There are three components that MacKinnon fuses together in
her attack on the speech/action distinction: (1) the action that went
into the making of a pornographic picture; (2) the pornographic
picture itself; and (3) the effect on viewers that the picture produces.
Although the types of harms she attributes to pornography are
temporally distinct, since one type of harm precedes the existence of
the picture and one type occurs after its making, MacKinnon conflates
all three of these components; she asserts that the picture is
inextricable from both sets of harms.
The same conflation has occurred in child pornography law. As
above, there are three distinct parts to the analysis: (1) the
molestation of a child that occurs in the production of a picture; (2)
the picture itself; and (3) the effect of the picture on its viewers. The
law has increasingly overlooked these distinctions. In doing so, child
pornography jurisprudence has given new validity to MacKinnon's
theories of speech and harm.
In the following Parts, I analyze the two ways in which child
pornography law has upset the speech/action distinction. First, I
explore how Ferber conflated photographs with the underlying illegal
action that produced them. In this way, it collapsed the distinction
between representation and reality. Second, I show that child
pornography law since Ferber, through both judicial and legislative
expansion, has begun to prohibit speech based on the effects it has on
its viewers. This development attributes an agency to language that
ignores the distinction between speech and its results. Child
pornography law has come to allow the government to police the
realm of fantasy, a realm thought to be protected under First
Amendment law.
1. A Representation Is Not the Thing Itself
"Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself."
-Wallace Stevens2c
WALLACE STEVENS, Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself, in THE PALM AT
THE END OFTHE MIND 387 (Holly Stevens ed., 1971).
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Ferber eroded one aspect of the speech/action distinction when it
introduced the idea that a representation can be banned because of
the underlying illegal act that produced it. This reasoning parallels
the first axis of MacKinnon's attack: she argues that adult
pornography should be prohibited because of the harm done to the
women depicted when they posed for its production.
As soon as the Ferber decision was handed down, critics
immediately recognized that its reasoning was troubling. Calling the
case "an unfortunate episode in First Amendment law," the Harvard
Law Review derided the opinion for its "nonchalance" and its failure to
"articulat[e] a coherent constitutional theory" or a clear
"constitutional basis of its decision."270 The same article warned that
the "Court's failure to articulate ... limitation[s]" on the decision
leaves it "precariously susceptible to extension in future first
amendment decisions."2 7 Writing about the decision later that year in
the Supreme Court Review, Fred Schauer noted that "it is difficult to
trace the Court's doctrinal route to... [nonprotection of child
pornography] .272 Despite this initial criticism, the issue was quickly
dropped in the following years. No law review article has revisited the
decision in any depth since then.23
Ferber departed from a fundamental assumption underlying the
speech/action distinction: the simple idea that speech is separate
from what it depicts, describes, or represents. In other words, a
picture of a piece of fruit is not the fruit itself; an image of a child is
not the same thing as the real child it portrays. This illustrates a basic
semiotic principle: that there is a distinction between signifier and
signifiedY.
270 The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 119, at 145, 148. The authors added
that the Court's opinion "suggests a troubling disregard of the gravity of any
departure" from First Amendment protection. Id. at 145.
271 Id. at 150.
272 Schauer, supra note 15, at 299. Schauer goes on to view the category as sui
generis and indicative of the increasing "codification of the First Amendment." Id. at
309. As will be clear, I disagree with Schauer's assertion that the category is sui generis;
I argue instead that its principles cannot be contained.
73 Recently, an author lamented in passing that Ferber "has provoked almost no
hostility in the law reviews, and commentators seem to find little of interest in the
opinion for an undivided Court. This neglect is unfortunate...." Anita Bernstein,
The RepresentationalDialectic, 87 CAL. L. REV. 305, 367 (1999).
For one of the foundational works in linguistics, which became the basis for
much semiotic scholarship, see FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., McGraw-Hill
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The normal First Amendment rule therefore recognizes that a
photograph of a criminal act is not the same thing as a crime. If a news
photographer captures a picture of a bank robber in the act, for
example, we might publish his photograph on the front page of the
newspaper, not ban it. As Thomas Emerson wrote: "[T]he basic
principles of a system of freedom of expression would require that
society deal directly with the [illegal] action and leave the expression
alone."' 7
Of course, it is still possible to prosecute the photographer of a
crime for any involvement he may have had with the crime itself. The
216picture does not protect him. Suppose someone took a picture of a
murder. Perhaps, if the photographer had merely happened upon
the act and had been unable to intervene, we would laud his
journalistic coup. If he had participated in the murder, we would
prosecute him for murder. In the most extreme case, if he committed
the murder in order to photograph it, we might consider it a
particularly perverse murder. But in any of these events, the First
Amendment would make it exceedingly difficult to criminalize the
photograph of the murder.'17 We would prosecute the photographer
1966) (1915).
275 EMERSON, supra note 233, at 494. This principle was recently applied in the
Food Lion case, where reporters committed trespass and another tort in gathering news,
but the resulting broadcast was still protected expression under the First Amendment;
therefore, publication damages could not be awarded based on the underlying torts
committed while newsgathering. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d
505,521 (4th Cir. 1999).
This is contrary to what MacKinnon intimates in the opening of Only Wards,
where she appears to suggest that taking pictures decriminalizes underlying crimes of
rape. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 224, at 4 ("[T]he pictures, far from
making what happened undeniable, are sex, proof of your desire and your consent.").
For a statement of the conventional First Amendment rule, see, for example, Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) ("The press may not with impunity break
and enter an office or dwelling to gather news."). The Cohen Court explained that
"[E]nforcement of... general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny
than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations." Id. at
670. %
See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) ("[S]tate action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional
standards."); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978)
(upholding the newspaper's right to publish accurate information about confidential
judicial proceedings); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam) (allowing publication of so-called Pentagon Papers despite the fact that the
papers had been stolen from the Pentagon); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 129
(3d Cir. 1999) ("[N]o court has yet held that the government may punish the press
through imposition of damages merely for publishing information of public
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for the act, not the picture. And although some might hope that
notions of journalistic taste would prevent a newspaper from
publishing the picture, First Amendment law would almost certainly27<
protect the newspaper's right to do so. 9
But consider the law of child pornography: it is the only place in
First Amendment law where the Supreme Court has accepted the idea
that we can constitutionally criminalize the depiction of a crime!"', The
Court in Ferber recognized that it was already a crime to abuse a child in
order to produce child pornography. It observed that producing such
materials is "an activity illegal throughout the Nation."28 But the Court
consciously chose to permit criminalization of the pictures too. And in
doing so, it introduced into its jurisprudence an entirely new rationale
for banning speech.
It seems that only afterwards did some members of the Court realize
the troubling implications of what they had done as a unanimous Court
in Ferber. In Osborne v. Ohio, Justice Brennan's dissent raised questions
about what he viewed as the majority's abandonment of the
significance because the original source acquired that information in violation of a
federal or state statute."), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2716 (2000); Food Lion, Inc., 194 F.3d
505 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that torts committed while newsgathering may be
actionable, but news that is obtained as a result of those torts is protected expression).
But see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989) (stating that the Court still
has "not settie[d] the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired
unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the
unlawful acquisition, but [also] the ensuing publication"); Boehner v. McDermott, 191
F.3d 463, 471-78 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (allowing punishment of a middleman who gave a
newspaper information that a source had obtained in violation of federal wiretapping
statutes, but expressly reserving the question of whether the newspaper itself could be
punished for publication of the same information).
In the intellectual property context, different rules come into play. See Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 566-69 (1985) (holding that a
court may enjoin publication or award damages post-publication for publishing stolen
intellectual property, including trade secrets).
278 As explained above, some of the cases cited in the previous footnote suggest
that this statement might require qualification.
279 Whether or not it would be deemed too sensational to publish the photograph
is a separate question. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Diana Photo Restarts Debate over Lack of
Restrictions on Internet Postings, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at D9 (describing the
controversy over the publication of a photograph "purporting to show Diana, Princess
of Wales, as she lay dying in the back of a crashed Mercedes").
28U See Schauer, supra note 15, at 291.
281 NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982).
2 The Court criminalized possession at least in part to assist law enforcement. As
the Ferber Court noted, child pornography is produced in a clandestine underground
industry; it is a particularly hard crime to prosecute. Id. at 760.
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speech/action distinction. Joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens,
Brennan warned that the Court had ignored "fundamental principles
of our First Amendmentjurisprudence":
283
The notion that possession of pornography may be penalized in order to
facilitate a prohibition on its production, whatever the rights of
possessors, is not unlike a proposal that newspaper subscribers be held
criminally liable for receiving the newspaper if they are aware of the
publisher's violation of child labor laws .... [A]lthough the need to
protect children from exploitation may be acute, it cannot override the
284right to receive the newspaper.
Although Brennan directed his dissent to a problem unique to
Osborne-the criminalization of mere possession, as opposed to
distribution-his criticism undermines the logic of his adherence to
the Ferber ruling. His Osborne dissent calls into question the legitimacy
of the very core of Ferber: the notion that expression should ever be
curtailed to prohibit underlying illegal action.
2. The Rhetoric of Literalism
Child pornography law conflates act and image on a rhetorical as
well as a legal level. First, we ban the pictures because of the
criminality of the underlying act, which is already a peculiar move in
First Amendment law. Then, the rhetoric of the law replicates this
compression. The connection between the underlying child abuse
and the picture is so strong that courts and legislators often speak of
them as if they were one and the same thing, as if the criminality of
the act infects the picture itself. Courts and legislatures continually
repeat the mantra: "Child pornography is child abuse."' The
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, in its widely cited
1986 Report, emphasized the point: "[T]here can be no
understanding of the special problem of child pornography until
there is understanding of the special way in which child pornography
is child abuse."' C'" It is as if the abuse inheres in the image.
This rhetorical conflation of thing/representation is typical of
495 U.S. 103, 144 n.18 (1990) (Brennan,J., dissenting).Id. at 145 n.19. AlthoughJustice Brennan offered this argument in the context
of Ohio's ban on possession, there is no logical reason why his point would not apply
to bans on distribution and sale of child pornography as well.
ATTORNEy GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 28, at 406.
Id.
20011
986 UNIVERSI7TOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:921
antipornography and anti-hate-speech theories. 27 For example, Toni
Morrison says of hate speech: "'Oppressive language does more than
represent violence; it is violence.' 2 8 8 In a similar fashion, Catharine
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin insist that "pornography is... the
subordination of women."289 Pornography does not represent the
subordination of women, it does not cause it, it is it. It "is a form of
forced sex."2 MacKinnon writes, "representation is reality."2' When
the Seventh Circuit evaluated MacKinnon's antipornography
ordinance, it seized on and rejected this very point. The court
disagreed with MacKinnon, writing: "[T]he image of pain is not
necessarily pain.... [A] book about slavery is not itself slavery. ' ' 2
MacKinnon frequently derides critics for their failure to
understand this essential basis of her theory, that pornography is sex,
not the representation of sex. She writes, for example: "The most
elite denial of the harm [of pornography] is the one that holds that
pornography is 'representation,' when a representation is a
nonreality. Actual rape arranges reality; ritual torture frames and
presents it. Does that make them 'representations,' and so not rape
and torture?"
293
Indeed, MacKinnon expresses bewilderment with critics who in
her view do not understand that she literally means that pornography
is "an act against women;" she protests that critics misread her claim
"as metaphorical or magical, rhetorical or unreal, a literary hyperbole
287 One other place this kind of reasoning surfaces is in Schauer's famous
justification of the Court's holding in Roth v. United States that obscenity is not speech
for purposes of the First Amendment. Roth premised this exclusion on the basis of the
speech's lack of any value. 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) ("[Implicit in the history of
the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance."). Schauer argues that this exclusion should be justified on the nature of
obscenity itself. He contends that obscenity is not speech because it is designed to
produce a "purely physical effect." Frederick Schauer, Speech and 'Speech"--Obscenity
and "Obscenity:" An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. LJ.
899, 923 (1979). He writes, "[M]aterial appealing to the prurient interest is sex, and
not merely describing or advocating sex." Id. at 928.
288 BUTLER, supra note 255, at 6 (quoting Toni Morrison, 1993 Nobel Lecture in
Literature) (emphasis added).
289 DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 224, at 36 (emphasis added).
20 MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 224, at 197 (emphasis added).
291 MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 224, at 29.
2 Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
293 MACKINNON, ONLYWORDS, supra note 224, at 28.
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or propaganda device." 4 In child pornography law, at last, the Court
seems to understand what MacKinnon's critics have dismissed as
metaphor: the picture is the harm. MacKinnon has been vindicated.
It is therefore no wonder that Catharine MacKinnon praises the
Supreme Court's child pornographyjurisprudence. It validates, albeit
in a different context, one of the two central arguments that underlie
her reasoning about why pornography should be unprotected. She
argues that, just as "child pornography is prohibited as child abuse,
based on the use of children to make it,"0 the sexual abuse of women
that occurs in the production of adult pornography should be the
basis for regulating it." MacKinnon explains: "Women are known to
be brutally coerced into pornographic performances. But so far it is
only with children, usually male children, that courts see that the speech
of pornographers was once someone else's life."27  In child
pornography law the Court has finally understood her view, that "sex
pictures [should be] legally considered sex acts."2s
3. In Defense of Ferber
Nonetheless, there are other bases on which to defend Ferber
insofar as it conflated criminal acts with their depictions. First, it is
arguable that the conflation of image and act may be justified because
of the special circumstances surrounding child pornography. Child
pornography is not just the product of a crime of child abuse. It may
sometimes serve as an inducement to commit it. Getting the pictures
may be the point (or one point) of the crime of molestation.
Ferber gestured toward this rationale when the Court discussed the
need for child pornography law as a mechanism to enhance the
enforcement of criminal prohibitions on child abuse. Noting the
difficulties facing law enforcement officials who try to stop sexual
abuse, the Court explained, "[t]he most expeditious if not the only
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 35-41. MacKinnon's proposal depends on regulating speech that (as a
category) was not the product of a crime. Despite MacKinnon's protestations to the
contrary, women who pose for pornography are not categorically "victims" in the same
sense that children are when they are sexually molested to make pornography.
Children are legally incapable of consenting to such acts. Women, according to
MacKinnon, are incapable of consenting because of social conditioning.
z-7 MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 224, at 208.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 224, at 36.
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practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market" by
punishing its distribution as a means to prevent its production. 2 '
The Court considered a related'argument for banning speech in the
1991 case of Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Board." At issue was a so-called "Son of Sam" law in New York
that deprived criminals of profits from books they had written describing
their crimes."1 The Court held that depriving criminals of the "fruits of
the crime" was a legitimate state interest, but that the regulation before
it was not narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Although Simon &
Schuster illustrates the difficulty of tailoring laws to limit speech in such
contexts, the case nonetheless lends legitimacy to the general notion,
embedded in Ferber, that the state may at times have an interest in
regulating speech that stems from crimes. In fact, child pornography
presents an even more compelling case for regulation on this basis than
do the "Son of Sam" laws. While it seems implausible that many people
would commit crimes in order to sell the book rights, in the realm of
child pornography, the recording of the crime of molestation may be a
significant incentive for committing it.
Still, is it correct to say that child pornography "&' child abuse and
to treat it accordingly? Here is where the expanded definition of child
pornography discussed in Part II begins to undermine the law's
rationale. It is more accurate to say that child pornography as we
currently define it is sometimes the product of child abuse and sometimes
the aim of child abuse. The law now criminalizes pictures in which there
was no underlying crime. This is in contrast to Ferber, which was
premised on the idea of banning pictures that were the product of "an
activity illegal throughout the Nation." °2 Ferberwas problematic to begin
with. In light of its expansion, it is even more so.
My analysis has focused on the problems inherent in the central
foundation of Ferber. As Professor Nimmer explained in his widely
cited hornbook, "Ferber is, in a nutshell, a statement by the Court that
the First Amendment does not protect child abuse."3 3 It is important
2" NewYork v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982).
30 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
301 New York's "Son of Sam" law required that a criminal's income from works
describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account to be awarded to the victims of
the crime if they filed a civil action and received a money judgment within five years of
the establishment of the escrow account. Id. at 109-10.
M2 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.
303 SMOLLA, supra note 248, § 7.03[3]-7-39; see also Free Speech Coalition v. Reno,
198 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Nothing in Ferber can be said to justify the
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to note, however, that Feder did not rest exclusively on this rationale.
The Court also emphasized the State's compelling interest in protecting
children.2"" In addition, other rationales bolstered the Court's
reasoning. These other, more peripheral, rationales °O--such as
concern for the privacy of children who are molested, °" or the general
assumption that child pornography as a category is "low value"
speech"'--pro dde additional support for the decision.
The privacy rationale may prove to be significant. Although
privacy as a justification for banning speech had been waning in
importance, recent decisions in the lower courts suggest that it may
be on the ascendancy.'" Once again, however, because of the
regulation of [child pornography] other than the protection of the actual children
used in [its] production. . . ."), cert. granted sub noma. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
"'I For further discussion of this rationale, see infra notes 316-19 and
accompanying text.
!... For further discussion of these rationales, see Schauer, supra note 15, which
analyzes the rationales of Ferber.
1. The Court explained that one way in which child pornography is "intrinsically
related to the sexual abuse of children" is that "the materials produced are a
permanent record of the children's participation and the harm to the child is
exacerbated by their circulation." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. "'Because the child's actions
are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, long after
the original misdeed took place.'" Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting David P. Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 535,
545 (1981)).
.7 For an argument that the category may not be so low value, see supra notes 81-
86 and accompanying text. For criticism of the low value category more broadly, see
Adler, Post-Modern Art, supra note 71.
... Set Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Btaudis's Pivac' Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 362-63 (1983) (noting problems with
the presenation of the tort of invasion of privacy as a cognizable cause of action).
Zimmerman shows that the Warren and Brandeis privacy tort "cannot coexist with
constitutional protections for freedom of speech and press." Id. at 293.
"". This rationale may be a particularly strong and independent justification for
the Court's decision, particularly in light of recent circuit court decisions that have
given new vigor to the law of privacy. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 128
(3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the Wiretapping Acts may not be constitutionally applied
to penalize the use or disclosure of illegally intercepted information if the defendant
did not participate in or encourage the interception), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2716
(2100); Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to the Wiretapping Act as applied to a congressman, who,
acting as a middleman, gave copies of an intercepted tape recording to various
newspapers). Although these cases suggest that privacy interests have growing
importance as a rationale for restricting free speech, the privacy rationale may still be
of diminished force in child pornography cases because of the expanded definition of
child pornography." See supra notes 90-93 (discussing privacy concerns in a
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expanding definition of the category of "child pornography," this
rationale has diminished force when applied to child pornography
law. The Court initially conceived of the privacy problem in terms of
the danger that a child would be "haunted" by pictures of his
molestation. As the Ferber decision explained, "[b]ecause the child's
actions are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him
in future years, long after the original misdeed took place."310 But
given that "child pornography" has come to include pictures in which
there was no initial abuse, it is inaccurate to suppose that children
depicted in such photographs would be "haunted" by anything, since
haunting implies a return of a previous experience. As Justice
Brennan explained in his dissent in Osborne v. Ohio:
there is no requirement that the State show that the child was abused in
the production of the materials or even that the child knew that a
photograph was taken.... I do not see how a candid shot taken without
the minor's knowledge can "haun[t]" him or her in the years to come,
when there is no indication that the child is even aware of its
existence.
Even though the problem of "haunting" may be less forceful in
light of the expanding doctrine, one could still argue that when a
pedophile presents an innocent picture of a child in a sexual context,
that child suffers harm to his dignity or reputation. Although the
Court has not explored such a route, this reasoning indicates that
libel law may provide a model for rethinking child pornography law. '
2
C. Conflating Representation and Its Effects
A second conflation of image and act has occurred in child
pornography law: a coftflation between pictures and their effects. In
contrast to the previous Part, in which I discussed the tendency to
confuse an image with what it represents, I focus in this Part on the
related but separate tendency to believe that an image can produce
the thing it represents.
Usually, we recognize that there is a distinction between speech
hypothetical of a girl on a beach).
310 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759 n.10 (citations omitted).
31 495 U.S. at 143 n.18 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
312 I only suggest this comparison as a possible route for future scholarship. An
analysis of its utility is beyond the scope of this piece. I also note that the apparently
discredited concept of "group libel" set forth in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
258 (1952), provides an interesting point of comparison for child pornography law.
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and its results. A picture of violence does not mystically enact
violence. The picture of violence might lead to violence, but that is only
a possible rather than a necessary result of the power of the picture.
The violent result does not invariably inhere within it. In child
pornography law, however, even when a photograph is not the
product of a crime, we fear that it may in turn produce a crime. We
fear that the existence of child pornography will incite pedophiles to
molest other children, that it will socially construct a world in which
more people view children as sexual.
In other contexts, such rationales for banning speech would be
patently unconstitutional. It has become 31 3 a truism in free speech law
that society cannot regulate speech because of the way it makes
people think or feel. The government cannot police our thoughts,
but only the behavior that might follow from them.1 Modern First
Amendment jurisprudence depends on this principle. Even in the
volatile context of child pornography, the Court has explicitly
adhered to this rule. In Jacobson v. United States, a 1992 entrapment
case involving child pornography, the Court quoted its earlier
decisions that "a person's inclinations and 'fantasies... are his own
and beyond the reach of government."''5 In the earlier case of
Osborne v. Ohio, in which the Court accepted a ban on the possession
of child pornography, the majority justified its decision by clarifying
that "[t] he State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regulating
[the defendant's] mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted [the statute] in
order to protect the victims of child pornography... ."36
Individual fantasy is beyond the reach of the law; it follows from
- As I explain above, however, the Court did not adhere to this principle in
several early cases (particularly those involving political fear of socialism and
communism). Later cases, such as Brandenburg firmly rejected this trajectory. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that the state may
not forbid the encouragement of the use of force or violation of the law unless
imminent lawless action is the aim and likely result of that advocacy); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969) ("Whatever the power of the state to control public
dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts.").
A-', 503 U.S. 540, 551-52 (1992) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 67 (1973)); see also United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more
imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not
free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.").
,1,, Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
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this principle that the power of speech to change or construct society
more broadly is an impermissible basis for regulation. We expect
speech to change society. It is because speech has such power that it
occupies a central role in our vision of democracy.
Catharine MacKinnon rejects these standards in the second prong
of her attack on pornography. MacKinnon argues that we must ban
pornography because of its forceful social conditioning, the way it
changes our perception of all women. She views the harms caused by
pornography as so immediate and inevitable that she blurs the
distinction between speech and its results. As the Seventh Circuit
explained in striking down a MacKinnon-based antipornography
ordinance, "[i]f the fact that speech plays a role in a process of
[social] conditioning were enough to permit governmental
regulation, that would be the end of freedom of speech."
1 7
Ferber had deliberately avoided this course. As Fred Schauer
observed, "Ferber contains not a single word addressed to the effect of
child pornography on its viewers, or the effect that a proliferation of
child pornography might have on the community. '315  The Ninth
Circuit emphasized this principle in a child pornography decision last
year: "Nothing in Ferber can be said to justify the regulation of [child
pornography] other than the protection of the actual children used in
[its] production. ...""9
Child pornography law has changed significantly since Ferber,
317Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985), afifd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986). Of course, we recognize that speech frequently eads to action and
that it influences behavior. See, e.g., id. at 328-29 ("People often act in accordance with
the images and patterns they find around them."). Such is a testament to the power of
speech.
318 Schauer, supra note 15, at 291; see also United States v. United States Dist. Court
for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 858 F.2d 534, 545 (9th Cir. 1988) (Beezer,J., dissenting) ("A
child pornography law is akin to a child labor law: both are concerned with the
conduct through which a product is made, not with what the product is or the
product's effects on consumers."); United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 844-47 (9th
Cir. 1986) (upholding a conviction for undeveloped film of nude minors although no
visible image had been produced because the purpose of the law was to protect the
children who were victimized through the creation of the material); TPBE, supra note
175, §§ 12-16, at 914-15 ("Ferber seems to signal a heightened sensitivity on the Court's
part to the harms that pornographic activity can inflict upon participants.... .").
319 Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted
sub nom. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001); see also SHIFFRIN,
supra note 7, at 24. Describing Ferber, Shiffrin wrote, "The stated concern of the
legislature generally had nothing to do with any meaning effects produced by the
films.... [T]he state's principal justification did not depend upon a claim that the
content conveyed was itself injurious." Id.
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however. These changes have unfolded along three different paths,
which I follow below. First, I analyze a new rationale for banning
child pornography that the Court introduced in Osborne v. Ohio.
Second, I uncover the implicit rationale that underlies the expanding
definition of child pornography. Third, I turn to Congress's latest
foray into child pornography law, the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996. This legislation is blunt about its goal: it prohibits
speech in order to prohibit society from thinking about children in a
sexual way. While this goal may seem admirable, its constitutional
basis is radical: in my view, Congress has enacted Catharine
MacKinnon's theories of speech and harm into federal law.
1. The New Rationale in Osborne v. Ohio
In Osborne v. Ohio, the Supreme Court made an explicit move
towards regulating child pornography based on its potential effects.2
The Court introduced a new rationale: one reason why the
government may prohibit child pornography is because pedophiles
might use it to lure new victims. As the Court explained, "evidence
suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other
children into sexual activity."32' The Court only added this rationale
to the ones established in Ferber;3122 it did not state that this rationale
could stand alone in justifying the prohibition of child
pornography.323 Nonetheless, the Court widened its lens: not only did
it see the children who had been used to produce child pornography in
the past, but it also saw children who would be future victims of
molestation.
Until Osborne, it was unheard of in modern First Amendment law
that speech could be banned because of the possibility that someone
might use it for nefarious purposes. The decision is a departure from
'" 495 U.S. at 103.
,A Id. at 111.
.22 Id.
2 One problem with this rationale is that it seems so broad: pedophiles use so
many different materials to seduce children, including adult pornography, money,
candy, and gifts. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 95-438, at 9 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
40 ("An offer of money, food, or shelter, or even a few friendly words or a show of
concern can lead [children], unquestioning, into the hands of exploiters for purposes
of pornography or prostitution."); see also Osborne, 495 U.S. at 143 n.18 (Brennan, J.,
disenting) (noting that the Attorney General's Commission on pornography stated that
both adult and child pornography are used by pedophiles to lower the inhibitions of
children).
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a basic free speech principle, articulated by Justice Brandeis: "Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech ......
The Court has relied on this rule in its obscenity doctrine. In a 1959
case, it quoted Justice Brandeis, declaring that "'[a] mong free men,
the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education
and punishment for violation of the law, not abridgment of the rights
of free speech.' 325 In a later obscenity case, Stanley v. Georgia, the
Court repeated this point, affirming that "the State may no more
prohibit mere possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may
lead to antisocial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry
books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits., 326  Yet in child pornography law, the Court
rejected this precept.
327
Nonetheless, Osborne still avoided a thornier question. It focused on
child pornography as a tool of crime, but it did not talk about the effect
of child pornography more broadly on its adult viewers. The Court
therefore avoided a direct statement that speech may be regulated
because of the fantasies it provokes in its audience. Two other
developments, however, have led the law in this direction. I describe
them below.
2. The Implicit Rationale Behind the Expanding Definition
Although child pornography law still claims to be aimed at
protecting children from abuse in the production of the material, the
324 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
325 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689
(1959) (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring)); see also Burke,
supra note 15, at 465 (arguing in the context of virtual child pornography that
"suppress[ion of the material] on the grounds that it may lead to the victimization and
abuse of children is too tenuous a link under First Amendmentjurisprudence").
326 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969). Of course, there is much more
latitude for regulation based on this principle when the material to be regulated is not
speech and therefore does not invoke First Amendment protection. Compare, for
example, state laws that prohibit actual tools that are used primarily to commit crimes.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.315 (Michie 1995) (banning possession of burglary
tools); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7(a) (5) (West 1997) (proscribing possession of devices
that are used to make telephone calls without paying for them); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 5/16-15 (1996) (banning possession of theft-related devices).
32 This departure might, however, find some justification in another line of cases,
which allows for greater regulation of speech that is directed to a child audience. See,
e.g., Ginsberg v. United States, 390 U.S. 629, 635 (1968) (introducing a variable
obscenity standard for material sold to minors).
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category no longer does what it says it does. So I ask: what does it
actually do? What is the rationale for banning pictures of children
who were not harmed in the production? Why do we regulate images
that appeal to the lascivious interests of pedophile viewers, but do not
stem from acts of abuse? Implicit in our regulation of such material is
the view that there is another harm to these pictures.
Child pornography has become a thought crime. Quite simply,
we do not like the way people think about certain pictures of children.
This is evident in the ever-expanding definition of "lascivious
exhibition of the genitals" and the attempt of courts and legislatures,
as I demonstrated in Part II, to police pictures that appeal to the
sexual fantasies of pedophiles, regardless of how those pictures were
produced.
The law demands that we examine pictures to determine how a
pedophile would see them; we then criminalize these pictures, or not,
depending on that viewpoint. As amici argued before the Supreme
Court in Knox, the question becomes, does the picture "invite
pedophiles to fantasize?" 2S  Indeed, the law acknowledges that
pictures may be susceptible to multiple interpretations. It may not be
obvious whether pictures are child pornography. Therefore, we must
"study" them and conjecture the possible response of the pedophile
voyeur.
But once our interpretation depends on the pedophile's imagined
response to the picture, we have begun to police thoughts and fantasy,
not actions. The harm of the pictures no longer turns on what
happened to the child. It now occurs in the possibility of seeing a
picture in a certain way, in how someone might perceive the child. The
determination of whether a picture is child pornography has grown
increasingly bound up in our projections of whether these pictures
will permit pedophiles to fantasize about them. Thus, child
pornography law has begun to police speech based on how people
may respond to it. This is in direct contravention of traditional First
Amendment tenets.
'J1 Brief of National Law Center for Children and Families et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of the Respondent at Part IV.C.v, Knox v. United States, 510 U.S. 939
(1993) (No. 92-1183).
"' United States v. Villard, 700 F. Supp. 803, 811 (D.N.J. 1988).
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3. The Child Pornography Prevention Act
Congress significantly broadened the scope of child pornography
laws in 1996 when it passed a new statute, the Child Pornography
Prevention Act ("CPPA").0 The CPPA is premised on a radical view of
language. It has, in effect, enacted MacKinnon's theory of speech into
law.
The CPPA responded to a technological innovation, the
development of wholly computer-generated or "virtual" child
pornography. In response to this technological shift, Congress
decided to outlaw, under the rubric of child pornography law,
materials that appear to be (but are not) depictions of children
engaged in sexual conduct.3 3' According to Congress, such material,
even though it is made without the use of real children, must be
prevented because, inter alia, it "inflames the desires of child molesters,
pedophiles, and child pornographers"332 and it "encourag[es] a societal
perception of children as sexual objects. 3
In this respect, the CPPA is a total departure from Ferber, which was
premised on preventing the abuse of children in the production of
the material. In fact, so great was the emphasis on harm to real
children in Ferber that the Court even suggested an alternative mode
to produce sexual images of children: "if it were necessary for literary
or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps looked
younger could be utilized."314 In light of this dictum, the creation of
virtual child pornography seems like a solution to the problem of
child pornography as the Ferber Court framed it. But in passing the
CPPA, Congress rejected that view. The law has so far withstood
constitutional challenge in the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits; in
December of 1999, the Ninth Circuit struck it down.33 The Supreme
330 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110
Stat. 3009-26, 3009-26 to -31 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2252A, 2256 (Supp. IV
1998)).
331 "[Clhild pornography' means any visual depiction ... of sexually explicit
conduct, where... (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted,
or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct...." 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B)-(C) (Supp. IV 1998).
332 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 § 121 (10) (B).
333 Id.§ 121(11)(A).
334 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982).
35 See United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 653 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
the law was not facially invalid, overbroad, or void for vagueness); United States v.
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Court will review that decision next Term.
3 6
Congress's stated concerns in passing the CPPA go directly to the
effect of child pornography on viewers. Congress determined that
virtual child pornography can be prohibited even though its
production does not require the use of real children because the
existence of such material "inflames the desires of child molesters,
pedophiles, and child pornographers." Although it upheld the CPPA,
the First Circuit commented that "Congress has not kept secret that
one of its motivating reasons for enacting the CPPA was to counter
the primary effect child pornography has on those who view it."33 7 In
striking down the legislation, the Ninth Circuit observed that the
CPPA was premised on the view that "'a major part of the threat to
children posed by child pornography is its effects on the viewers of
such material."'"" It found the legislation unconstitutional because it
"attempts to criminalize disavowed impulses of the mind, [and] evil
idea[s]., -
In fact, Congress's justifications for the CPPA are based not only
on concern for the effects of child pornography on the fantasies and
desires of pedophiles. Congress was also concerned with the effects of
child pornography on all of society: that it would change the way all of
us think about children. In particular, Congress stated the following
among its specific rationales for banning virtual child pornography:
that it "can desensitize the viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse"
and that child pornography "encourag[es] a societal perception of
Carroll, 190 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1999), withdrawn in part and reinstated in part, 227 F.3d
486 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir.
1999) (holding that the law survives a facial constitutional challenge because it does
not impinge substantially on protected expression nor is it so vague as to offend due
process). But see Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding
the law to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
136 Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. at 876 (granting certiorari).
17 Hilton, 167 F.3d at 69 (footnotes omitted). The Act cannot be justified under
the secondary effects doctrine which permits regulation of speech so long as the
regulation is "justified without reference to the content of the ... speech.'" Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)); see also City of Erie v. Pap's
A.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000) (upholding a ban on nude dancing based on its
"Secondary effects"). In contrast, the CPPA prohibits child pornography not because
of its secondary effects but because of its direct expressive impact.
" Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1091 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-358, at 17
(1996)).
-1 Id. at 1094.
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children as sexual objects."40
The legislation is therefore based on a social construction theory
of language. The reasons proffered for prohibiting virtual child
pornography are strikingly similar to those given by MacKinnon in
support of her proposal to regulate adult pornography. First, just as
Congress worried that child pornography makes us "perceive children
as sexual objects," so MacKinnon argued that pornography should be
unprotected because it makes us perceive all women as sexual objects.
Second, Congress's concern for our societal desensitization to child
pornography seems taken directly from MacKinnon's work as well.
MacKinnon writes of the "progressively desensitized consumer",-4 ' of
pornography, who requires "more and more violence"042 to keep
pornography sexy.
When the Ninth Circuit struck down the CPPA, it found that the
Act represented a "remarkable shift in the First Amendment
paradigm."3 4 3  As noted above, it has long been thought
unconstitutional to ban speech because of its social construction
effects. Consider the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in rejecting
MacKinnon's antipornography ordinance. The court assumed that
pornography reached by the statute may indeed have the effect of
"perpetuat[ing] subordination."34 But the Court concluded that such
an effect "simply demonstrates the power of the pornography as
speech" and was therefore an impermissible basis on which to regulate
it.3
Despite the troubling failure of MacKinnon's theory on both a
constitutional as well as a linguistic level, child pornography law has
begun to follow the path that she has paved. The inexorable direction
of child pornography law is toward policing fantasy. In varying and
subtle ways, the law has begun to prohibit the targeted speech because
of its effects on viewers.
Some have argued that the CPPA is unconstitutional under
existing interpretations of First Amendment law. If it is, as I believe it
340 Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1) (4),
(1) (11) (A).
341 MACKINNON, FEINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 224, at 151.
342 Id.
343 Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1095.
4 Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 329 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
3 Id.
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is, then it is not a sudden unconstitutional shift in child pornography
law." ' Rather it is the culmination of a subtle and inexorable erosion
of free speech principles that has been ongoing in child pornography
law since its inception.
The Supreme Court will review the constitutionality of the CPPA
next Term.!" As the issue winds its way through the courts, one thing
seems clear: if this Act is held constitutional, then courts and
commentators must reconsider their longstanding rejection of
antipornography and anti-hate-speech proposals. The theoretical
underpinnings of the CPPA are extraordinarily similar to those
underlying leftist theories of speech.
4. Extending Child Pornography Law
By collapsing the speech/action distinction, all of the extensions
of child pornography law chronicled above indicate a deeper
theoretical problem: they are premised on a naive account of how
language works. Of course, child pornography has bad effects. Of
course, it has the power to socially construct our culture.3 8 But child
pornography law relies on a monolithic and simplistic understanding
of how this construction functions. This problem is identical to the
one that underlies MacKinnon's scholarship. In the language of
linguistic theory, both child pornography law and MacKinnon's work
rely on a belief that pornography is "illocutionary," that it will
automatically "perform" what it depicts.49  In other words,
3" See, e.g., Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996: Confronting
the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 639, 641 (1999) (describing the
CPPA as "radically different" from previous law).
-7 Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. at 876 (granting certiorari).
'f See C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More Than Words, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181, 1197-
98 (1995).
q' The semiotic distinction I am drawing is between "illocutionary" and
"perlocutionary" speech acts. J.L. AustiN, How To Do THINGS VITH WORDS 99-131
(J.O. Urmson ed., 1962) (introducing and distinguishing these two terms). Essentially,
a perlocutionary speech act (most speech acts) may produce certain effects as a result
of the utterance, but the utterance and its consequences are temporally distinct. In
contrast, an illocutionary speech act is one which is itself the deed that it effects.
Examples are such phrases as "I sentence you to prison" or "I christen this ship the
Titanic." The act of saying the words performs what the words describe at the moment
they are spoken. For interesting uses and critiques of Austin, see PIERRE BOURDIEU,
Part II: The Social Institution of Symbolic Power, in LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 105,
105-62 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991)
(1982); JAcQuES DERRIDA, A COMMUNICATION TO THE CONGRtS INTERNATIONAL DES
SOCIETtS DE PHILOSOPHIE DE LANGUE FRAN(ISE, reprinted in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY
20011
1000 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:921
pornography inevitably begets a pornographic society; it conjures up
and reproduces itself, spurring pedophiles to reenact its images, or
transforming "normal" people into pedophiles.
I do not dispute that language has the potential to work in such a
powerful manner. But there is a crucial distinction between observing
the illocutionary potential of an utterance and viewing that
illocutionary aspect as inevitable, as if an image or a statement must
perforce enact what it represents.5 The view of language embedded
in child pornography law ignores the complexity of social
construction. It ignores the way that any utterance or image inevitably
produces multiple interpretations and, therefore, multiple and
fluctuating effects.5' To believe otherwise is to magically conflate
352speech and its effects. I admire this view to the extent that it
recognizes the power of speech. But I reject it because it offers a
simplistic account of the mechanisms of that power.
Furthermore, if we were to accept this vision of the power of
speech, there would be no obvious stopping point; it would be
difficult to ignore its ramifications for other areas of the First
Amendment. Indeed, the spillover effect is manifest: courts have
already begun to cite child pornography precedents to support
309-10 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1982) (1972); Rae Langton, Speech Acts and
Unspeakable Acts, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1993);John Searle, Reiterating the Differences:
A Reply to Derrida, 1 GLYPH 198 (1977). Antipornography and anti-hate-speech scholars
view pornography and hate speech as illocutionary. I do not dispute the illocutionary
potential of language. Indeed, I believe this potential may be found in words well
beyond the scope of those Austin recognized as illocutionary. But there is a distinction
between observing the illocutionary potential of an utterance and viewing that
illocutionary aspect as inevitable.
3r0Austin accounted for this problem in his theory of "infelicity." A speech act
may be "infelicitous" in the sense that the conditions under which it is performed may
deny its force to produce a result. All performatives are thus subject to misuse and
misfire. AUSTIN, supra note 349, at 16.
35 See generally BUTLER, supra note 255 (examining the power of speech to injure
or counter injury).
2 See SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE LITERARY SPEECH ACT: DON JUAN wrrH J.L.
AUSTIN, OR SEDUCTION IN Two LANGUAGES (Catherine Porter trans., Cornell Univ.
Press 1983) (1980) (using Lacanian theory to expand on Austin); see also Adler, 11hat's
Left?, supra note 20 (setting forth this theory of interpretation); Judith Butler, The Force
of Fantasy: Mapplethorpe, Feminism, and Discursive Excess, 2 DIFFERENCES 105, 105-06
(1990) ("[A]nti-pornography positions that favor censorship ... rel[y] upon a
representational realism that conflates the signified of fantasy with its (impossible)
referent and construes 'depiction' as an injurious act and, in legal terms, a
discriminatory action or 'real'-effect.").
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restrictions on free speech that have nothing to do with children.'5'
The premises of child pornography law cut deep into the heart of free
speech theory.
Yet even if we could successfully isolate the revolution that has
occurred in child pornography law, to do so would raise different yet
equally troubling questions: it would require us to accept an
increasingly disjointed and incoherent body of First Amendment
law. ' We would have to acknowledge that when it comes to certain
subjects, we treat speech like conduct, yet when it comes to others, we
grab on to the distinction.35
This Article set out to show that child pornography law violates
certain basic First Amendment principles. But in revealing the vexing
problems that plague child pornography law, perhaps it has shown
something more unsettling: that there are no such things as "basic
First Amendment principles," that a quest for coherence within free
speech law is doomed to failure.
CONCLUSION
"It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears."
-Justice Brandeis, concurring in Whitney v.
Californ id5
A prominent example comes from a D.C. Circuit opinion last year, in which the
court relied on child pornography precedents to support a decision that threatens the
ight of newspapers to print truthful information of public importance, when such
information raises privacy concerns. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 469 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). This term, the Supreme Court will hear an appeal from a Third Circuit
decision that reached a different result on the same issue. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200
F.3d 109, 128 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2716 (2000).
KA The costs and benefits of an increasingly complex body of First Amendment
law have been set out by others. For two particularly useful discussions, see SCHAUER,
supra note 155, and Robert Post, supra note 235. Post's account reveals some of the
virtues of a context-specific approach to speech law. Post acknowledges that existing
First Amendment doctrine is on the edge of complete "disintegration." He argues for
a different understanding of the First Amendment, one that is rooted in a flexible
notion of "social practices," rather than an abstract conception of speech. Id. at 1270-
74.
Although a more complex body of First Amendment doctrine could provide
for greater flexibility, it also presents the danger that the doctrine will become overly
subjective and open to manipulation. If there is no central theory of how speech
works, it may allow us to ban speech based on how repugnant we find it. It is easy to
recharacterize as "conduct" any unpopular expression.
'"' 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
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The desire to erase the distinction between speech and conduct is at
the core of many censorship movements. When it comes to
pornography or hate speech or violence in the media, we repeatedly
hear this argument: speech is so powerful that it will conjure up what
it depicts, as if a picture carried within it the thing it represented, or
operated as an imperative to repeat the act it portrayed.1
7
This view has deep cultural roots. Despite our strong free tradition
to the contrary, there is an equally strong cultural tradition from which
these new developments in child pornography law have sprung. The
tendency to equate speech with what it represents is an ancient
instinct. It is evident, for example, in the widespread belief among
native peoples that a picture captures your soul.35 It is also evident in
the longstanding worship of images as religious icons or the belief
that certain pictures have talismanic properties. 9 Such uses depend
on a fusion between speech and its subject or its effects.
The law of free speech has long struggled against this view of
representation. For a while, in the early subversive advocacy cases, the
Court succumbed to it. Political anxieties of the day led the Court to
compromise the First Amendment. But later decisions rejected this
view of representation. By insisting on the division between speech
and what it represents or causes, modern First Amendment law
marked a triumph of rationality over religious, magical, or
superstitious views of speech.
At times of great cultural anxiety, however, this other view of
speech reasserts itself. Such is the case with the crisis of child
pornography and the law that has grown up to combat it. A fear of
speech, an urge to fuse representation with reality, lurks as a dark
undercurrent in our rationalistic free speech jurisprudence.o
357 See generally BUTLER, supra note 255 (analyzing the power of performative
speech).
358 See SIR JAMES GEORGE FRAZER, THE GOLDEN BOUGH: A STUDY IN MAGIC AND
RELIGION, PART II: TABOO AND THE PERILS OF THE SOUL 96 (3d ed. 1976) (describing
the belief among Eskimos and Native Americans that "the portrait is the soul, or at
least a vital part of the person portrayed").
359 See generally DAVID FREEDBERG, THE POWER OF IMAGES (1989) (discussing
iconoclasm); JOHN PHILLIPS, THE REFORMATION OF IMAGES xii (1973) (explaining the
cultural view during the English Reformation of images as "perilous in themselves, full of
the destructive power of their always-suspect origins").
36O In a separate piece, I explore these issues more fully. SeeAmy Adler, The Thirty-
Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures: The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2001).
